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Jdi 



NOTES 



ON THE 



:rsonal memoirs of P. H. SHERIDAN 



BY 



CARSWELL McCLELLAN, 

BREVET UEUTEN-ANT-COLONEL V. s. VOLS. 




ST. PALM, 
(press of m» m . £. (gcnm'ng 3r. 

1S89 







COPYRIGHT, 1889, 
P.\ CARSWELL McCLELLAN. 

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 



"To vindicate a citizen unjustly assailed, is 
the duty of all men who properly estimate 
the value of individual character and its in- 
fluence on the public good." 

— Reverdy Johnson. 



NOTES. 



THE WILDERNESS 



AND 



SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 



On April 6, 1864, in compliance with orders from 
the War Department, Major-General Philip H. Sheri- 
dan assumed command of the Cavalry Corps of the 
Army of the Potomac. That corps needs no eulogy 
here. Around the standards of its regiments clung 
memories of Virginia lowland fields and fords, of 
Loudon's glades, and Blue Ridge passes, of Mary- 
land's hills and vales, and Gettysburg's fields and 
roads, that time cannot blur or language brighten. 
From its records, clustering around that of the 
heroic Buford, flashed many a name that told of 
knightly deed and daring. There was no small 
honor held, no slight obligation taken, with the 
chieftainship of that veteran command. 

On examination, it is obvious that the official re- 
ports of General Sheridan, as published in Volume n, 
Supplemental Report of the Joint Committee on the 
Conduct of the War, 38th Congress, 2d Session, con- 
stitute, as far as General Sheridan is concerned, "the 
record" so confidentlv referred to bv General Grant 



in the preface to his Personal Memoirs. Interest in 
these reports, and in General Badeau's Military His- 
tory of U. S. Grant and General Grant's Memoirs, is 
revived by the publication of the "Personal Memoirs 
of P. H. Sheridan." In what relates to the Army of 
the Potomac, these last memoirs add but little to the 
volume of statements contained in the preceding 
companion and complementary works, but they in- 
vite attention by furnishing explanation of much 
that hitherto has seemed to many anomalous and 
perplexing. 

For a quarter of a century past, all criticism, or 
argument, or narration, tending to support, or de- 
fend , the reputations of the veterans of the Virginia 
battle fields, as against statements, or implications, 
or claims, made by, or on behalf of, Generals Grant 
and Sheridan, has been met by clamorous charges 
of jealousy. General Sheridan's Memoirs are an in- 
teresting commentary upon this line of argument. 

Commencing on page 353 of his first volume, he 
re-states from his report of May 13, 1866, in brief, 
that his new command presented a fine appearance ; 
that the showing, so far as the health and equipment 
of the men were concerned, was good and satisfac- 
tory, but that the horses were thin and worn down 
by excessive and, it seemed to him, unnecessary 
picket duty ; that from the very beginning of the war 
the enemy had shown more wisdom respecting his 
cavalry, and that at that very time he ( the enemy ) 
was husbanding the strength of his horses by keep- 
ing them to the rear so that they might be in good 
condition for the impending campaign. He says 
that, before and after a review of his troops a few 
clays after he had assumed command, he took in the 
situation and determined to remedy it if possible ; 



that, while he knew it would be difficult to overcome 
the custom of so subordinating the operations of the 
cavalry to the movements of the main army that in 
name only was it a corps at all, still he thought it his 
duty to try. He states that, in fulfilment of that 
duty, he sought an interview with General Meade 
and informed him that, in his opinion, as the effect- 
iveness of his command lay mainly in the strength of 
his horses, the duty the cavalry were then performing 
was both burdensome and wasteful ; that cavalry 
should be kept concentrated to fight the enemy's cav- 
alry ; that moving columns of infantry should take 
care of their own fronts ; that, if he ( General Meade ) 
would let him (General Sheridan) use the cavalry as 
he contemplated, there need be little fear as to at- 
tacks upon the trains or flanks and rear of the 
army, as it was his object to defeat the enemy's cav- 
alry in a general combat, if possible, and by such a 
result to establish a feeling of confidence in his own 
troops that would enable him, after a while* to 
march where he pleased destroying the communica- 
tions and resources of the enemy. He does not state, 
however, what substitute he suggested to General 
Meade to be used in place of the cavalry arm of the 
Army of the Potomac until such time as the desired 
confidence had been acquired by his corps, and the 
enemy's resources were destroyed, or in the event of 
the failure of his efforts to engage and defeat the 
enemy's cavalry in a general combat. He states 
that, though at different times during General 
Meade's command of the Army of the Potomac the 
cavalry had been massed in considerable bodies for 
special purposes, and that, though the interview re- 
sulted in his command being relieved from much har- 
assing picket service, still he received but little en- 

* Note. All italics are the present writers, unless noted. 



couragement from General Meade whose convictions 
were opposed to the proffered suggestions. Those 
convictions General Sheridan states were, in brief, 
that the cavalry commander should be so located 
that the commander 'of the army could give to that 
arm such "detailed directions as, in his judgment, 
occasion required;" that cavalry was fit for little 
more than guard and picket duty, the protection of 
trains, and the covering of the fronts and securing 
the flanks of moving infantry columns — that they 
were, in fact, so widely divergent from his ( General 
Sheridan's) opinions that disagreements arose dur- 
ing the battles of the Wilderness. § He says further: 
"Conscious that he [General Meade] would be com- 
pelled sooner or later either to change his mind or 
partially give way to the pressure of events, / 
entered on the campaign with the loyal determina- 
tion to aid zealously in all its plans", and he states 
that, after the battles of the Wilderness, "the cav- 
alry corps became more of a compact body, with the 
same privileges and responsibilities that attached to 
the other corps — conditions that never actually 
existed before." 

It is needless to comment upon how unkindly the 
concluding words just quoted reflect upon General 
Hooker's cherished reputation as the organizer of 
the cavalry corps. It cannot be necessary to recap- 
itulate the record of that corps under orders received 
from General Meade, in order to amend General 
Sheridan's assertion of the views held by his su- 
perior; and it would be wearisome to cite authorities 
as to the functions of the cavalry arm. It would 
seem to be superfluous to enlarge upon the manifest 
fact that, while the Army of Northern Virginia lay 
securely guarded by the encircling homes of friends 



every one of whom was constantly on picket, the 
Army of the Potomac, immediately confronting the 
Confederate army, was camped on hostile ground 
and surrounded by directly opposite conditions. It 
is hardly worth while to refer to Shiloh, or Mur- 
phreesboro, or Mauassas Junction. The point 
worthy of notice is, that, while General Sheridan 
confesses (Vol. i. p. 342) he was but slightly ac- 
quainted with military operations in Virginia when, 
on March 23, he was ordered to report for duty in 
that state, nevertheless, immediately after he had as- 
sumed his new authority, he felt fully competent to 
depreciate the command to which he had been ele- 
vated and to spurn the record of the men who, within 
the setting of many another clash of steel, and car- 
bine volley, and thunder of horse artillery, had — led 
by Generals Buford and Gregg, under the command 
of General Pleasanton — through the long hours of 
June 9, 1863, crossed sabres with the Cavalry Corps 
of the Army of Northern Virginia urged on by its 
dashing chief and his able subordinates Generals 
Hampton and the Lees; — who, under General Bu- 
ford, had met and held the advancing Confederate 
infantry on that July 1, made ever memorable in his- 
tory by their staunchness; — and who, under Gen- 
erals Gregg and Custer, on the third day of that 
same July, received their old acquaintances of the 
Southern "long sword, saddle and bridle," upon 
their advent on the decisive battle field of the war, 
with a welcome that never after left their memories. 
Nor did he hesitate to instruct in elementary military 
science, and enlighten as to his duty and privileges in 
connection with the cavalry of his command, his su- 
perior officer — a veteran distinguished in both mili- 
1 tarv and civil life before General Sheridan had been 



6 



graduated — who had participated in all the cam- 
paigns of the Army of the Potomac and, on un- 
sought assignment by the President, had for ten 
months been its commander. He says: "My prop- 
osition seemed to stagger General Meade not a 
little," — and it well may be believed, for, if words 
have any meaning, that proposition was, in effect, 
that General Meade should unconditionally sur- 
render the control of his cavalry corps, and the safe- 
guard of the army for whose efficiency he was res- 
ponsible, into the hands of a comparatively unknown 
officer who appeared to believe that the operations 
of the main army should be subordinated to the un- 
restricted discretion of the commander of the cavalry 
arm. General Sheridan's Memoirs clear away any 
doubts that may have been left upon the subject by 
the accounts of either General Badeau or General 
Grant. 

It is believed that even a careless reader must 
note one result of the want of harmony between Gen- 
eral Meade's convictions and General Sheridan's as- 
pirations in that the accounts of the cavalry opera- 
tions during the Wilderness battles and the movement 
to Spottsylvania Court House, as given by General 
Sheridan in his report of May 13, 1866, and as re- 
peated by Generals Badeau and Grant, and as now 
again repeated, with some variations, by General 
Sheridan (Vol. i. p. 359 et seq. ), are thinly veiled ar- 
raignments of the intelligence of General Meade and, 
to use a mild expression, unsoldierly disparagement 
of the authority of the commander of the Army of 
the Potomac. 

After reciting the order in which the divisions of 
his corps crossed the Rapidan on May 4, 1864, and 
the positions and duties assigned to each, together 



with the location of his own headquarters at Chan- 
cellorsville, General Sheridan states that his orders 
to General J. H. Wilson, who with his division had 
preceded the Fifth Corps in the movement, had lo- 
cated that officer at Parker's Store, but that, on the 
morning of May 5, by direct order of General 
Meade, General Wilson was moved toward Craig's 
Meeting House ; that the movement resulted in seri- 
ous embarrassment to General Wilson ; and that an 
order from General Meade directing him (General 
Sheridan) to go to General Wilson's relief was the 
first intimation he received that General Wilson had 
been pushed out so far. His report of May 13, 1866, 
does not contain this concluding statement, how- 
ever, and Generals Badeau and Grant evidently 
missed the point that General Sheridan intended to 
make. On page 192 of his second volume, General 
Grant says : — 

My orders were given through General Meade for an early 
advance on the morning of the 5th. Warren was to move to 
Parker's Store, and Wilson's cavalry — then at Parker's Store — to 
move to Craig's Meeting House. 

The circular order for the movement, as issued 

by command of General Meade, commences: — 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac. 

May 4, 1864, 6 p. m. 

Orders. 

The following movements are ordered for the 5th of Mav, 
1864: 

1. Major-General Sheridan, commanding Cavalry Corps, 
will move with Gregg's and Torbert's divisions against the en- 
emy's cavalry in the direction of Hamilton's Crossing. General 
Wilson, with the Third Cavalry Division, will wove at 5 a. m., to 
Craig's Meeting House, on the Catharpin Road 

General Humphreys states (The Virginia Cam- 
paign of 1864 and 1865) that the order for General 
Sheridan's movement was issued at General Sheri- 



8 

dan's suggestion, he having reported during the 4th 
that he had received information that the main body 
of the enemy's cavalry was in the direction indicated. 
It is presumable that General Sheridan read the or- 
der as quoted, and was therefore aware of the move- 
ment intended to be made by General Wilson. In 
his report of May 13, 1866, he says : — 

It was now well understood that the enemy's cavalry at 
Hamilton's Crossing had joined General Lee's forces, and the ne- 
cessity for my moving to that point, as ordered, was obviated. 

On page 362 of the first volume of his Memoirs, 

however, he expresses it : — 

Information . . . that the enemy's cavalry about 
Hamilton's Crossing was all being drawn in, reached me on the 
5th, which obviated all necessity for my moving on that point as 
/ intended at the onset of the campaign. 

On pages 103 and 104 of the second volume of 
his History, General Badeau says: " . . the Brock 
Road is the key to all this region ; . . . Cutting 
all these transverse roads at right angles, it enabled 
whichever army held it to outflank the other, and 
was, of course, of immense importance to both com- 
manders." This is now well understood by all read- 
ers of war history, as is also the fact that, in the 
Wilderness battles, General Hancock's command, 
holding the intersection of the Brock Road with the 
Orange Plank Road, extending to within about two 
miles of Todd's Tavern and resting in the impene- 
trable forest that stretched on both sides of the 
Brock Road to that point, constituted the left flank 
of the Federal army. 

General Sheridan states that he was held respon- 
sible for the safety of the left flank of the army and 
the trains, and that he secured these objects, after 
Custer's and Devin's brigades had been severely en- 
gaged at the Furnaces, by holding the line of the 



Brock Road be\^ond the Furnaces, and thence around 
to Todd's Tavern and Piney Branch Church, and felt 
that the line taken up could be held, but that Gen- 
eral Meade, on false report, became alarmed about 
his left, and sent him a note, signed by General Hum- 
phreys and dated at one o'clock p. m. May 6, which 
stated : "General Hancock has been heavily pressed, 
and his left turned. The Major-general commanding 
thinks that you had better draw in your cavalry so 
as to secure the protection of the trains," — and that, 
in obedience to this order, he drew all the cavalry 
close in toward Chancellorsville, and thereby was 
subjected to heavy loss in regaining the points 
abandoned, when the orders for the movements of 
May 7, were received. Generals Grant and Badeau 
omit all reference to this matter, and General Hum- 
phreys says: "The drawing in of the cavalry the 
day before did not oblige them to fight on disadvan- 
tageous ground on the 7th, nor under any other ad- 
verse conditions." But suppose the results to have 
been as General Sheridan alleges, to whom should 
censure belong ? He states that he felt able to hold 
the line he had occupied for the express purpose of 
securing the protection of the trains, which was all 
the one o'clock dispatch required. He also states 
that he was responsible for the safety of the left Hank 
of the army, and General Grant corroborates the 
statement when he says (Vol. 2. p. 197): "On the 
morning of the 6th Sheridan was sent to connect 
with Hancock' s left and attack the enemy's cavalry 
who were trying to get on our left flank and rear." 
General Sheridan does not state, however, how it 
happened that he, with this responsibility resting 
upon him, was ignorant of the erroneousness of the 
report upon which General Meade, in the dense and 



11 

deadly forest-tangle to which he was condemned by 
General Grant, had based his dispatch ; and he offers 
no explanation of the fact that no apparent effort 
was made to determine the exact condition of affairs 
before surrendering a tenable line holding the needed 
Brock Road, and before abandoning Todd's Tavern 
— the key to the Federal left. 

General Sheridan states (Mem. Vol. 1, and Re- 
port of May 13, 1866), that, to remedy what he was 
satisfied was a misunderstanding upon which the or- 
der for the movement of the trains, on May 7, had 
been issued: "Gregg attacked with one of his'bri- 
gades on the Catharpin Road, and drove the enemy 
over Corbin's Bridge; Merritt . . . attacked 
with his division, on the Spottsylvania Road, driv- 
ing him toward Spottsylvania, and Davies's brigade 
of Gregg's division made a handsome attack on the 
Piney Branch Church Road, uniting with Merritt on 
the Spottsylvania Road."; that the enemy were pur- 
sued "almost to Spottsylvania Court House; but 
deeming it prudent to recall the pursuers at dark, he 
[I] encamped Gregg's and Merritt's divisions in the 
open fields to the east of Todd's Tavern." It is ab- 
out two miles from Todd's Tavern to the junction of 
the Piney Branch Church Road and the Brock 
(Spottsvlvania) Road, and something over three 
miles from that junction to Spottsylvania Court 
House, and the movement described by General Sheri- 
dan had, before his withdrawal, secured to him the 
most difficult and thickly wooded portion of the 
line. 

The following is a copy of General Meade's order 



12 



for movement under which General Sheridan was 
supposed to be acting : — 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac. 

May 7th, 3 p. m., 1864. 
Orders. 
The following movements are ordered for to-day and to- 
night : 

1. The trains of the Sixth Corps authorized to accompany 
the troops will be moved at four o'clock p. m., to Chancellorsville, 
and parked on the left of the road, and held ready to follow the 
Sixth Corps during the night march. 

2. The trains of the Fifth Corps authorized to accompany 
the troops will be moved at five o'clock p. m., to Chancellorsville, 
following the trains of the Sixth Corps and parking with them, 
and held ready to follow those trains in the movement to-night. 

3. The trains of the Second Corps authorized to accompany 
the troops will be moved at six o'clock p. m., to Chancellorsville, 
and park on the right of the road, and held read\ r to move at 
same hour with the other trains by way of the Furnaces to Todd's 
Tavern, keeping clear of the Brock Road which will be used by the 
troops. 

4. Corps commanders will send escorts with these trains. 

5. The Reserve Artillery will move at seven o'clock by way 
of Chancellorsville, Aldrich, and Piney Branch Church to theinter- 
section of the road from Piney Branch Church to Spottsylvania 
Court House, and the road from Alsop's to Block House, and 
park to the rear on the last named road, so as to give room for 
the Sixth Corps. 

6. At halt-past eight o'clock P. M. Major-General Warren, 
commanding the Fifth Corps, will move to Spottsylvania Court 
House by way of the Brock road and Todd's Tavern. 

7. At half-past eight o'clock p. M. Major-General Sedgwick, 
commanding the Sixth Corps, will move by the pike and plank 
roads to Chancellorsville, where he will be joined by the author- 
ized trains of his own corps and those of the Fifth Corps; thence 
by way (if Aldrich's and Pine}' Branch Church to the intersection 
of the road from Piney Branch Church to Spottsylvania Court 
House and the road from Alsop's to Block House. The trains of 
the Fifth Corps will then join its corps at Spottsylvania Court 
House. 

8. Major-General Hancock, commanding Second Corps, will 
move to Todd's Tavern by the Brock Road, following the Fifth 
Corps closely. 

9. Headquarters during the movement will be along the 



13 

route of the Fifth and Second Corps, and at the close of the move- 
ment near the Sixth Corps. 

10. The pickets of the Fifth and Sixth Corps will be with- 
drawn at one o'clock a. M., and those of the Second Corps at two 
o'clock a. M., and will follow the routes of their respective Corps. 

11. The cavalry now under the command of Colonel Ham- 
mond will be left by General Sedgwick at the Old Wilderness Tav- 
ern, and upon being informed by General Hancock of the with- 
drawal of his corps and pickets will follow that corps. 

12. Corps commanders will see that the movements are 
made, with punctuality and promptitude. 

13. Major-General Sheridan, commanding Cavalry Corps, 
will have a sufficient force on the approaches from the right to 
keep the corps commanders advised in time oi the approach of the 
enemy. 

11. It is understood that General Bumside's command will 
follow the Sixth Corps. 

Jlv command of Major-General Meade, 

S. Williams, 

Asst. AdjutantGeneral. 

It will be observed that by this order General 
Sheridan was relieved from responsibility for the 
trains, which were to be parked on the left flank of 
the army, and it is manifest that his especial instruc- 
tions presupposed and necessitated his occupation 
of the Brock Road, for without that the instructions 
of the orders could not be obeyed. 

It is noticeable, and significant, that General 
Sheridan omits all reference to the proposed move- 
ments of the infantry and artillery from his account 
of his operations during the afternoon and evening 
of the 7th. It is true General Grant states (Vol. 2. 
p. 210): "During the 7th Sheridan had a fight with 
the rebel cavalry at Todd's Tavern, but routed them, 
thus opening the wav tor the troops that were to go 
by that route at night," and possibly this may be 
taken as an endorsement of General Sheridan's an- 
nouncement to General Meade "that moving col- 
umns of infantry should take care of their own 



14 



fronts," but. even if justification of his neglect of the 
manifest requirements of the orders of his comman- 
der can be found in that theory, the fact that posses- 
sion was disputed by Confederate cavalry still de- 
volved upon General Sheridan the duty of securing 
the road under his other dictum — "our cavalry 
ought to fight the enemy's cavalr}% and our infan- 
try the enemy's infantry." It would seem, therefore, 
that he should have furnished for the informatio'n of 
the future historian some more definite, and more 
pleasantly comprehensible, reason than he has vouch- 
safed for the surrender of what he had gained, and 
for his failure to comply with the requirements of the 
order from Headquarters of the Army of the Poto- 
mac. 

The allegation that interference by General Meade 
with the orders given by General Sheridan after he 
had "encamped Gregg's and Merritt's divisions in 
the open fields to the east of Todd's Tavern," pre- 
vented the occupation of the approaches to Spottsyl- 
vania Court House by the Federal cavalry and en- 
abled the enemy to secure possession of that point, 
originated in General Sheridan's official report of 
May 13, 1866, and was embodied by General Badeau 
in his Military History of U. S. Grant. The feebleness 
of the attempted aspersion of General Meade, in the 
interests of General Sheridan, was clearly exposed by 
General A. A. Humphreys, in "The Virginia Cam- 
paign of 1864 and 1865," but, nevertheless, the story 
was repeated by General Grant in his Memoirs, and 
is now again asserted, with a slight variation, by 
General Sheridan on pages 365 and 366 of his first 
volume. He says : — 

General Grant now felt that it was necessary to throw him- 
self on Lee's communications if possible, while preserving his 



15 



own intact by prolonging the movement to the left. Therefor, on 
the evening of the 7th he determined to shift his whole army 
toward Spottsylvania Court House, and initiated the movement 
by a night march of the infantry to Todd's Tavern. In view of 
what was contemplated, I gave orders to Gregg and Merritt to 
move at daylight on the morning of the 8th, for the purpose of 
gaining possession of Snell's Bridge over the Po River, the former 
b} r the crossing at Corbin's Bridge and the latter by the Block 
House. . . . During the night of the 7th General Meade 
arrived at Todd's Tavern and modified the orders I had given 
Gregg and Merritt, etc., etc. 

Space forbids the unnecessary repetition of the 
details of the unanswerable ( re-assertion is not an 
answer ) refutation ot this astonishing confusion of 
time, place, circumstance, and imagination, so per- 
sistently asserted. It is sufficient to note only two 
or three points. 

We have already seen General Meade's order as 

issued to his command. On page 208 of his second 

volume, General Grant gives his order, upon which 

General Meade's was based. It commences : — 

Headquarters, Armies of the U. S. 

May 7, 1864, 6:30 a. m. 
Major-General Meade, 

Commanding A. P. 
Make all preparations during the day for a night march to 
take position at Spottsylvania C. H. with one corps, at Todd's 
Tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the Piney 
Branch. and Spottsylvania road with the road from Alsop's to 
Old Court House. 

General Sheridan's own order to his cavalry, 

which General Meade is said to have modified and 

rendered ineffective, as it eventually reached General 

Gregg, is as follows : — 

May 8th, 1 a. m. 
Move with your command at 5 a. m., on the Catharpin 
Road, crossing at Corbin's Bridge, and taking position at Shady 
Grove Church. General Merritt will follow you, and at Shady 
Grove Church will take the left hand, or Block House Road, mov- 
ing forward and taking up position at that point [viz., Block 
House]. Immediately after he has passed, you will move forward 



16 



with your division, on the same road, to the crossing of Po River, 
where 3 r ou will take up position supporting- General Merritt. 
General Wilson with his division will march from Alsop's by way 
of Spottsylvania Court House and the Gate to Snell 's Bridge, 

where he will take up position The infantry march 

to Spottsylvania to-night. 

It is very clear from these orders alone that Gen- 
eral Sheridan is in error in stating that General 
Grant, on the evening of the seventh, determined 
upon the Spottsylvania movement and initiated it by 
a night march of the infantry to Todd's Tavern. 

Generals Badeau, Grant, and Humphreys concur 
infixing the time of General Meade's arrival at Todd's 
Tavern at about midnight. The divisions of Generals 
Gregg and Merritt at that time lay in bivouac con- 
fronting the enemy, the former upon the Catharpin 
Road, and the latter upon the Brock Road, so as to 
clear the ground around the Tavern. Discovering 
that General Sheridan was not with his troops, and 
that both Generals Gregg and Merritt were without 
orders ; and knowing that the head of the Fifth Corps 
column would soon arrive, and that instant action 
was necessary to any possible success in the move- 
ment which had commenced, General Meade gave the 
orders for the only dispositions that then remained 
practicable for the cavalry. He gave his instructions 
at one o'clock a. m., himself writing the orders, and 
also the notification sent to General Sheridan, and 
did not countermand or modify the order of General 
Sheridan, for that officer's orders reached the troops 
after those of General Meade had been issued. That 
General Meade's orders could not have prevented the 
success of General Sheridan's plans and combinations, 
is abundantly shown by the fact that, at, and from, 
the time when General Sheridan 's orders were writ- 
ten, the roads upon which he ordered his troops to 



17 

operate from Todd's Tavern were held in force hv 
the moving columns of the enemy. This fact is 
established beyond the reach of controversy by the 
official reports of Generals Pendleton, Anderson, 
Ewell, and Early, of the Confederate Army ; by the 
official report, and by the Personal Memoirs (vol. 2. 
page 211 ) of General Grant; by General Badeau's 
Military History ( vol. 2. page 138 ); and by General 
Sheridan himself when, on page 368 of his first vol- 
ume, he states that General Warren, assaulting 
Spottsylvania Court House on the morning of the 
8th, encountered General Anderson's ( Longstreet's ) 
corps. That corps was known to have been in posi- 
tion in the Wilderness lines at eleven o'clock on the 
night of the 7th and could not have reached 
Spottsylvania Court House, as correctly stated by 
General Sheridan, except via the Catharpin and 
Shady Grove roads. It may also be well to note 
here that Snell 's Bridge, the possession of which is in- 
sisted upon as of the utmost importance by Generals 
Badeau and Sheridan, is situated about two miles 
south of Spottsylvania Court House, entirelv out of 
General Lee 's line of march, and, although open to 
them, was not used ( see official reports ) hv the Con- 
federate Army in this movement 

Referring again to General Sheridan 's order of 
May 8th, 1 a. m., it will be noted that it entirely 
ignores the presence of the Confederate cavalrv upon 
the Brock Road. When General Merritt received his 
instructions from General Meade, his command lay 
m contact with this cavalry force, probably, about 
a mile east of Todd 's Tavern. The subsequent arri- 
val of the infantry produced no such confusion at the 
front as is claimed by Generals Badeau and Sheri- 
dan. The writer can affirm this of his own personal 



18 



knowledge, supported by the statement of General 
(then Lieutenant-Colonel ) Fred. T. Locke, Assistant 
Adjutant- General, Fifth Army Corps, that upon the 
arrival of the head of the infantry column at Todd 's 
Tavern he found the road blocked by the Provost 
Marshal's train and the headquarters escorts — 
as had also occurred at General Hancock's head- 
quarters soon after the column had started — and 
that it became absolutely necessary to halt there 
and wait for light. General Merritt commenced his 
efforts to clear the road immediately on receiving his 
orders about one o'clock a. m. General Warren, 
with the head of his column, reached the headquart- 
ers of the cavalry division about three o'clock a. m., 
when he halted and massed his troops in the rear of 
the cavalry- At General Merritt 's suggestion, when 
near the Alsop forks of the road, General Warren 
relieved the cavalry skirmish line with his infantry 
about six o'clock a. m., and not '.' about 11 o'clock " 
as stated by General Sheridan. The Fifth Corps then 
advanced along the Brock Road and assaulted the 
enemy holding that road near the Court House at 
the same time that General Wilson's cavalry division 
pushed through upon the Fredericksburg Road. The 
report of General W. N. Pendleton, Chief of Artillery, 
Army ot North Virginia, says : — 

About 9 a. m. of the 8th the head of the column came in 
sight of the Court House, and found the enemy just getting into 
view on the Fredericksburg Road, driving back a small cavalry 
force which there opposed them. At the same time a strong- infan- 
try column assailed another cavalry force which disputed their 
advance on the Todd 's Tavern Road. 

In his report of May 13, 1866, and in his Mem- 
oirs, General Sheridan states that when he learned of 
the orders given to Generals Gregg and Merritt by 
General Meade he for a time had fears for the safetv 



19 

of General Wilson, but that General Wilson held 
Spottsylvania Court House until driven out by Gen- 
eral Anderson 's command. He quotes a despatch 
sent to him by General Wilson at 9 o'clock a. m., of 
May 8th, which says : — 

Have run the enemy's cavalry a mile from Spottsylvania Court 
House; have charged them, and drove them through the village; 
am fighting now with a considerable force, supposed to be Lee 's 
division. Every thing all right. 

Evidently General Wilson was oppressed by no 

fears as to his own situation, and the report of 

General Pendleton, just referred to, bears testimony 

to the effective fire of his guns which opened " a flank 

reverse fire " upon the deploying forces of the enemy. 

General Badeau ( Vol 2, p. 141. foot note ) says: — 

As soon as Sheridan learned the change which Meade had 
made in the orders to Merritt and Gregg, and the consequent 
isolation of Wilson, he sent orders to that officer to fall back 
from Spottsylvania. 

General Sheridan makes no mention of this order 
in either his report or Memoirs, but the report of 
General John Bratton, C. S. Army, states: — 

We moved ... to Spottsylvania Court House, and 
arrived in the vicinity on the next morning (the 8th ) at about 10 
o'clock to find the enemy's cavalry in possession of and between 
us and the court house. My brigade formed on the right of the 
road and moved down to the court house, the enemy retiring be- 
fore us and abandoning the place without a fight. 

General Wilson was "all right" at nine o'clock 
and certainly, with the advancing Fifth Corps in 
sight, would not have retired as General Bratton 
describes at ten o'clock, except in obedience to or- 
ders. 

Having been relieved by the infantry of the Fifth 
Corps, General Merritt 's division remained upon 
and along the Brock Road, awaiting orders, until 
about eleven o'clock, and was then withdrawn to 



20 



the rear. There was in the army no gallanter com- 
mand than that division whose brigades were led by 
Devin, Custer and Gibbs. There was but one thing 
that prevented its movement to the left of the ad- 
vancing infantry and to such cooperation in the 
assault upon the Court House as would speedily 
have effected a junction with General Wilson's divis- 
ion and the repulse of the Confederate forces. The 
one thing preventing was the absence of "a loyal 
determination to aid zealously in all the plans " of 
the campaign on the part of the commander of the 
Cavalry Corps, who, to use again his own words, 
allowed two divisions of cavalry to remain practi- 
cally ineffective by reason of disjointed and irregular 
instructions from their commander. The official 
returns place the strength of the Cavalry Corps of 
the Army of the Potomac at about twelve thousand 
men, and that of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of 
Northern Virginia at about eight thousand men. 
General Sheridan states that, after furnishing the 
various details necessary for detached duty, he 
crossed the Rapidan with an effective force of about 
ten thousand troopers. A similar deduction from 
the reported strength of the Confederate Cavalry 
would put General Stuart 's effective force at less 
than seven thousand. General Sheridan had been 
verv positive in his assurance to General Meade that 
if allowed to go out and hunt for the enemy 's 
cavalry, he could soon destroy it. On the 7th of 
May, 1864, the Confederate troopers confronted 
him. ' He was hampered by no orders other than to 
place himself in position to give due warning of any 
approach of the enemy upon the right of the army ; 
and yet he claims for himself that he deemed it pru- 
dent to surrender the Brock Road to the enemy 's 



21 



cavalry, and thus suffered the advance of the army 
to be checked at Todd 's Tavern, and that, when on 
the morning on the 8th opportunity offered to re- 
trieve the error, he withdrew his troops and neglect- 
ed to aid in the assault upon Spottsylvania Court 
House. The Cavalry Corps of the Army of the 
Potomac had never had such a record put upon it 
before. Even General Badeau wails: "It certainly 
seems that a greater degree of vigor shown by the 
corps commanders at the front would not have al- 
lowed the prize of the entire movement to slip from 
their grasp," — and General Badeau is right in all 
save the use of the plural. General Sheridan was 
the only corps commander who could, or should, 
have been at the front when the success of the move- 
ment was possible. 

It is difficult, and by no means pleasant to any 
true American, to understand how a General com- 
manding the Army of the United States could have 
written General Sheridan 's account of his interview 
with General Meade a little before noon on May 8th, 
1864. Doubtless General Meade did exhibit some 
traces of "peppery temper" on that occasion. There 
can be found on record few military saints who, in 
the presence of the enemy, could, or would, quietly 
submit to being charged with imbecility in their 
command, and defied in their authority, by a subal- 
tern. Officers have forfeited life, as well as honor, for 
less than General Sheridan claims. 

However, with this interview, and its results, 
General Sheridan has given to the world the kev to 
the intricacies of the Military History and Personal 
Memoirs of General Grant, as they relate to the 
Army of the Potomac and its Commander. 
He states that, when General Meade visited General 



22 



Grant at the headquarters of the Armies of the United 
States, and there, in relating the circumstances of 
the "acrimonious interview" just had, mentioned 
that General Sheridan had asserted that he could 
whip Stuart if he ( General Meade ) would only let 
him, General Grant's reply was, "Did he say so? 
Then let him go out and do it;" that the intimation 
was immediately acted upon by General Meade, and 
that a little later he received from that officer his 
orders for the "Richmond Raid." General Grant, 
however, gives a somewhat different coloring to the 
matter. In volume 2, page 153, he says: On the 
8th of May, just after the battle of the Wilderness 
and when we were moving on Spottsylvania / di- 
rected Sheridan verbally to cut loose from the Army 
of the Potomac, pass around the left of Lee 's army 
and attack his cavalry : . ■ . " General Humph- 
reys expresses it: "At 1 p. m., by order of General 
Grant, General Sheridan was directed to concentrate 
his available mounted force and move against the 
enemy's cavalry, . . ." At noon of May 8, Gen- 
eral Meade's headquarters were near Todd 's Tavern, 
and General Grant 's were at Piney Branch Church, 
about two miles from the Tavern. The described 
interview with General Sheridan ; the visit to General 
Grant 's headquarters and the conference with the 
Lieutenant-General ; the giving of the necessary 
instructions, and the issuing of the one o'clock order 
for the raid ; very fully occupied the little more than 
an hour from the time when General Sheridan says 
that General Meade sent for him. No one has stated 
at what time on the 8th of May, before one o'clock 
p. m., General Grant took occasion to give his verbal 
instructions to General Sheridan. 

General Badeau ( Vol. 2, p. 52 ) states that, on 



23 



the recommendation of General Grant, General Buell 
was promptly dismissed from the army when he de- 
clined to accept the offer of the command of a corps 
under General Sherman, his junior in rank. General 
Sheridan, if the language of his Memoirs has weight 
in evidence, neglected the orders and rebelled against 
the authority of his superior and commanding offi- 
cer, and Lieutenant-General Grant ordered him to 
the separate command that he coveted. It remained, 
however, for the last General of the U. S. Armv to 
boast of the fact to the country that had elevated 
him, and to leave the, at least, questionable prece- 
dent as a legacy to the Army for whose esprit and 
discipline he was thought to have been intelligently 
responsible. 

What, better than his own words, can indicate 
the nature of the "events" that General Sheridan 
was "conscious," even before the opening of the 
campaign of 1864, would produce the "pressure" 
under which General Meade "would be compelled 
sooner or later to change his mind or partially give 
way?" Certainly no clearer light than their own 
pages furnish need be thrown upon the animus of 
the Military History and the Personal Memoirs of 
General Grant, in connection with the. Personal 
Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan. 

It is unnecessary to make any comparison be- 
tween the conduct held by General Meade toward 
General Sheridan and that confessed by General 
Grant toward General Meade. Even Generals Grant 
and Badeau are forced to acknowledge that General 
Meade was a very loyal gentleman and soldier. 

Some months after the preceding pages were 
written, the report of the Association of the Gradu- 



24 



ates of the U. S. Military Academy, June 12, 1889, 
has been published containing a memoir of General 
Sheridan by General Jas. H. Wilson. It is believed 
that expressions used therein relieve this memoir of 
much of the sanctity usually accorded to obituary 
writings and permit the use of brief reference and 
quotation here. 

General Wilson relates that, by open mutiny on 
parade and by assault upon a Cadet Sergeant whose 
duty required that he should reprimand and report 
Cadet P. H. Sheridan for offences against discipline, 
Cadet Sheridan earned a suspension of a year which 
turned him back one class in his course at the Mili- 
tary Academy- The account concludes with the 
unique eulogium : — 

In this incident the hoy displayed the most marked charact- 
eristic of the man, and the one to which he was principally 
indebted for the high rank and great distinction which he reach- 
ed in the war of the Rebellion. 

After this frank confession by one of General 
Sheridan's most persistent and enthusiastic panegyr- 
ists, one reads with some surprise, a little further on, 
the statement : — 

He was not one of those pedantic grumbling fellows who 
always knew more than their commanding officer and never ap- 
proved the plan they were expected to carry out. He was the 
prince of subordinate commanders, and by his unfailing alac- 
ritv won his way straight to the confidence of those in authority 
over him. 

Still a little further on, and General Wilson is 
moved to admiration of the fact that General Sheri- 
dan "never failed in a doubtful situation to contend 
to the utmost for victory, nor to claim it strenuously 
whether he had clearly won it or not." 

In connection with this last quotation, the 
following extract from the concluding paragraphs oi 



25 



General Sheridan 's official report of May 13, 1866, 

is not without interest : — 

It will be seen by this report that we led the advance of the 
army to the Wilderness ; that on the Richmond raid we marked 
out its line of march to the North Anna, -where we found it on our 
return; that we again led its advance to Hanovertown, and 
thence to Cold Harbor; that we removed the enemy's cavalry 
from the south side of the Chickahominy by the Trevillian raid, 
and thereby materially assisted the army in its successful march 
to the James River and Petersburg, where it remained until we 
made the campaign in the vahVv ; marched back to Petersburg, 
and again took its advance and led it to victory. 

It is believed that, unless, perhaps, in the pages 
of the Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, this 
paragraph cannot be surpassed in military litera- 
ture. 



26 



FIVE FORKS. 



In the History of the Second Army Corps, the 
author, General Francis A. Walker, referring to the 
removal of General Warren from his command after 
the battle of Five Forks, Va., April 1, 1865, re- 
marks : — 

What is infinitely to be regretted is, that the brilliant and 
fortunate successor of Grant and Sherman did not, when the heat 
of action had passed, when the passions of the moment had 
cooled, himself seize the opportunity which his own power and 
fame afforded him, to take the initiative in vindicating the 
reputation of one of the bravest, brightest, and most spirited of 
the youthful commanders of the Union Armies. It would not 
have diminished the renown which Sheridan won at \ellow 
Tavern, Cedar Creek, and Five Forks, had he welcomed an 
early occasion to repair the terrible injury which one hasty 
word, in the heat of battle, had done to the position, the fame, 
and the hopes of the man who snatched Little Round Top from 
the hands of the exulting Confederates. 

Neither General Adam Badeau, sixteen years af- 
ter the battle of Five Forks, nor General Grant, five 
years later, nor General Sheridan, two years later 
still, have been able to comprehend this fact stated 
by General Walker; and yet, General Badeau, un- 
questionably speaking for, and 'of, his principals, 
with due rhetorical introduction announces that, 
"wo one hut a hero is fit to command armies.'"' 

Imaginings of Deity take many an awkward and 



27 



grotesque shape while worship advances from fetich- 
ism to enlightened adoration, and between the denial 
of the valet and the verdict of history there are 
many varying and often contradictory applications 
of the title Hero. In the quotation just made, Gen-, 
eral Walker has suggested one line of thought con- 
necting generalship with heroism. General Badeau, 
more in accord with so-called practical conceptions, 
somewhat limits his ideal by the dogma, "in military 
matters nothing which is successful, is wrong;" As 
yet another perception, the words of the late Mr. 
Chas. Gibbons, of Philadelphia, are suggestive. Said 
Mr. Gibbons : — 

Heroism is not an uncommon virtue. There are others 
more rare and no less essential in forming the character of a 
great soldier. All American soldiers North and South, have 
proved themselves heroes, but we cannot expect to find in every 
one a Thomas, a Washington or a Meade. Such men are not 
common in any country. They seem to be set for special occa- 
sions and as examples. They do not thrust themselves into no- 
tice. The}- do not come swaggering into the history of the times. 
They are not vain-glorious nor enviotis. They "bear their facul- 
ties" meekly, and are guided by a better cynosure than their own 
personal renown. 

It is purposed to glance briefly at the account 
now given by General Sheridan of the part taken bv 
General Warren, with the Fifth Army Corps, in the 
battle of Five Forks. While General Sheridan's final 
statements and arguments add nothing to asser- 
tions already often repeated, a consideration of the 
method and circumstance of their persistent presen- 
tation may throw light upon the character of the 
heroism of that officer and his consequent right to 
command the following of soldiers, or the attention 
of the public, to the prejudice of an illustrious con- 
temporary. 

In his account of the operations of March 30, 



28 



1865, General Sheridan's first reference to General 
Warren mentions (Vol 2. p. 146) the hasty call he 
made at the headquarters of that officer in the after- 
noon, after his visit to General Grant's headquar- 
ters, and states that he found General Warren 
"speaking rather despondently of the outlook, being 
influenced no doubt by the depressing weather." 
The remark is worthy of note only because it is the 
first of a series of statements. Considering the con- 
dition' of affairs at General Grant's headquarters, as 
described by General Sheridan, there is not much to 
occasion surprise or comment in the statement. 
General Sheridan continues : "From Warren's head- 
quarters I returned by the Boydton Road to Dinwid- 
die Court House, fording Gravelly Run with ease." 
The brevity and, in connection with succeeding 
assertions, the evident intent of this statement, call 
to mind certain portions of the evidence given before 
the court of inquiry ultimately convened as one of 
the results of the operations under consideration. 
On pages 1034-5 of the Proceedings of the Warren 
Court of Inquiry, the following is recorded in the 
testimony of General U. S. Grant: — 

Cross-examination by Mr. Stickney, counsel for the appli- 
cant : 

y. When you say "previous conduct," you mean, of course, 
your understanding of his previous conduct? — A. Certainly; of 
course, always my understanding. 

Q. You would admit quite as readily as any other man in 
the world that you might have made a mistake in your judgment 
upon those past matters? — A. / am not ready to admit that; 
no, sir. 

Q. What you claim is not that you cannot make a mistake, 
but that you did not make a mistake? — A. 1 have no doubt I 
made many mistakes, but not in that particular. 

Q. In this particular you do not think you did make one? — 
A. No. 

On page 57 of the same record — General Sheri- 



29 



clan being under examination by Mr. Stickney — we 
find : — 

0\ What papers have you referred to in making up this 
statement which was read before the court? — A. I have taken 
copies from the original papers in the War Department. 

Q. Have yon had or used any other papers than these copies 
now in your possession in preparing your present statement? — A. 
None that I know of except an extract from the report of General 
Pickett. 

Q. Did you have a pamphlet of General Warren, among 
other things ? — A. Yes; sir, I did not consult it, I never read it. 

Q. You did not use that then ? — A. A r o, sir. 

A recent critic has said in laudation of General 
Grant : — ''To any one who knew much of Grant's pe- 
culiar mental traits, it would be quite easily believed 
that when Grant had asserted either matter of fact 
or of opinion he quite naively assumed that the bur- 
den of proof was on him who questioned it. . .His 
quiet but undoubting confidence in himself was one 
of the conditions of his great successes." As the 
century opened, many were, in like manner, enrap- 
tured by Napoleon — the self-crowned Emperor of the 
Continent — because he "appeared to be of bronze." 
To-day, there are few who doubt that but for the 
character evinced in that same much lauded "monu- 
mental" carriage the pathway of the Emperor of 
France would not have led through Moscow to St. 



Helena. It is something other than naive self- 
confidence that — relying upon the support of credu- 
lous popular prejudice acquired — stolidly ignores 
all argument, or fact substantiated, in correction of 
its assumptions. 

The insinuation in the manner of General Sheri- 
dan's statement that he forded Gravelly Run with 
ease late in the afternoon of March 30, while a good 
illustration of the pertinacity in which he rivaled his 



30 



friend and commander General Grant, cannot be 
classed as ingenuous or heroic. It was indelibly in 
evidence before the Warren Court of Inquiry (Recoicl 
m, 155-7) that, on the night of March 31, Gravelly 
Run at the crossing of the Boydton Road, had been 
swollen by rain till it was flowing bank-full and was 
not fordable for infantry, but that the necessary 
bridging was pushed with such energy that the 
march of General Ayres's division to the relief of 
General Sheridan was in no way retarded thereby. 
Of this fact General Sheridan could not plead igno- 
rance. On page 90 of the record of the court we 
find that request was made by the President of the 
court that the Secretary of War would authorize 
the court record to be printed from day to day, 
assigning the following as one reason for the apph- 
cation : — 

the court in its inquiry, as well as to all concerned. 

After a characteristic account of the action be- 
tween his cavalry command and the forces „&r 
General Pickett, on March 31, General Sheridan 
(Vol 2. p. 154) continues: — 

Bv following me to Dinwiddle the enemy's ^^f^n 
Pletel/isolated itseh, and hence t,e „, off *-££ » 
troops a rare opportunity Lee ^ ^outs ^ fa 

we desired, and the general-m-chief reahzed TO e _ 

received the first report of ^J^^^^J^M^ 
dated it too from the information he got fro* X^pta* 
en route to army headquarters with the hist g 

this telegram to General Grant : 

•'Headquarters of the Army of thejotomac 

"March 31, 1865. 9.45 P. M. 

"Lieutenant-General Grant: 

"Would it not be well for Warren to go clown with his whole 



31 

corps and smash up the force in front of Sheridan ? Humphreys 
can hold the line of the Boydton Plank Road, and the refusal 
along with it. Bartlett's Brigade is now on the road from G. 
Boisseau's, running north, where it crosses Gravelly Run, he 
having gone down the White Oak Road. Warren could go at 
once that way, and take the force threatening Sheridan in rear at 
Dinwiddie, and move on the enemy's rear with the other two. 

"G. G. Meade, Major-General." 

An hour later General Grant replied in these words : 

"Headquarters Armies of the United States, 
"Dabney's Mills, March 31st, 1865. 10.15 P. M. 
"Major-General Meade, 

"Commanding Army of the Potomac. 
"Let Warren move in the way you propose, and urge him not 
to stop for anything. Let Griffin go on as he was first directed. 
"U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General." 

These two despatches were the initiatory steps in sending the 
Fifth Corps under Major-General G. K. Warren, to report to 
me, . . 

In explanation of General Grant's reference to 
General Griffin, General Sheridan adds in a foot-note : 
"Griffin had been ordered by Warren to the Boydton 
Road to protect his rear." 

Again General Sheridan has neglected the record 
printed, at public expense, in great part for his con- 
venience and benefit, even to the extent of a very 
imperfect rendering of General Meade 's despatch of 
9:45 p.m. — see record page 125. 

At about five o 'clock p. m. of March 31, General 
Warren received from General Meade 's headquarters 
a despatch, dated 4:30 p. m., in which he was di- 
rected to secure his position on the White Oak Road ; 
informed that it was "believed that Sheridan is 
pushing up" ; and authorized, if he thought it worth 
while, to push a small force down the White Oak 
Road to "try to communicate with Sheridan; but 
they must take care not to fire into his advance." 
Before this despatch was received the attention of 



32 



General Warren, and of his command, had been 
attracted by the sound of General Sheridan 's engage- 
ment, and, as the firing was heavy and evidently 
receding in the direction of Dinwiddie Court House, 
General Warren, not in consequence of the despatch, 
but — to use his own expression — in consequence of his 
duty as a soldier to send re-enforcement, if he could, 
in the direction of a portion of our Army that was 
evidently hard pressed, on his own responsibility 
ordered General Bartlett to march at once toward 
the Bring and attack the enemy in the rear ( Record, 
pp. 232, 720, 768, 1175). General Bartlett obeyed 
this order promptly. At 5:45 p. m. General Warren 
received another despatch from General Meade 's 
headquarters, dated 5:15 p. m., directing him to 
"push a brigade down the White Oak Road to open 
it for Generial Sheridan, and support the same if 
necessary." General Warren answered by the fol- 
lowing report : — 

5:50 p. in. March 31. 
General Webb : 

I have just seen an officer and a sergeant from General Sheri- 
dan who were cut off in an attact by the enem}^ and escaped. 
From what they say, our cavalry was attacked about noon by 
cavalry and infantry and rapidly driven back, two divisions, 
Crook's and Devin's, being engaged. The firing seems to recede 
from me toward Dinwiddie. I have sent General Bartlett and my 
escort in that direction, but I think they cannot be in time. 

/ hear cannonading that I think is from near Dinwiddie C. H. 
Resp'ly G. K. Warren, Maj. Gen. 

This was received at General Meade's head- 
quarters, probably about 6:20 p. m., and was un- 
doubtedly the subject of General Meade's missing 
despatch of 6:35 p. m. to General Grant, the receipt 
of which is acknowledged in General Grant's tele- 
gram of 8:45 p. m. to General Meade. Captain M. 
V. Sheridan (Record, page 212.) testified that he 



33 

reached General Meade's headquarters, en route to 
General Grant with General Sheridan's message 
about 7:30 p. m., and this agrees with General 
Meade's despatch to General Grant dated 7:40, 
March 31. It is evident therefor that General War- 
ren at 5:50 p. m. sent to the headquarters of the 
Armies the first information of General Sheridan's 
discomfiture, and at the same time gave assurance of 
aid promptly attempted in the most effectual man- 
ner. Although ignored by the officer who in defiance 
of orders neglected to open the Brock Road for Gen- 
eral Warren on May 7, 1864, and who ordered two 
divisions of his command to march away from the 
sound of General Warren 's opening battle on the 
morning of May 8, 1864, the record is established 
beyond possibility of candid question. 

About 6:30 p. m., General Bartlett having been 
gone more than an hour, General Warren received 
from General Webb a despatch saying: — 

A staff- officer of General Merritt has made a report that the 
enemy has penetrated between Sheridan's main command and 
your position. This is a portion of Pickett 's division. Let the 
force ordered to move out the White Oak Road move down the 
Boydton Plank Road as promptly as possible. 

To this General Warren at once replied : — 

I have ordered General Pearson, with three regiments that 
are now on the plank road, right down toward Dinwiddie C. H. 
/ will let Bartlett work and report result, as it is too late to stop 
him. 

At 8 p. m. General Warren received the following 
order from General Meade : — 

Despatch from General Sheridan says he was forced back to 
Dmwiddie C. H. by strong force of cavalry supported by infantry. 
This leaves your rear and that of the Second Corps on the Boyd- 
ton Plank Road open and will require great vigilance on vour 
part. If you have sent the brigade down the Boydton plank 
it should not go farther than Gravelly Run, as / don't think it will 
render any service hut to protect your rear. 



34 

At 8:20 p. m. General Warren replied as fol- 
lows: — 

I sent General Bartlett out on the road running from the 
White Oak Road and left him there; he is nearly down to the 
crossing of Gravelly Run. This will prevent the enemy communi- 
cating by that road tonight. I have about two regiments and 
the artillery to hold the plank road toward Dinwiddie C. H. 

It seems to me the enemy cannot remain between me and 
Dinwiddie if Sheridan keeps fighting them, and I believe they will 
have to fall back to the Five Forks. If I have to move to-night 1 
shall leave a good many men who have lost their way. Does 
General Sheridan still hold Dinwiddie C. H. 

At 8:40 p.m. General Warren received the follow- 
ing ' ' confidential ' ' despatch : — 

The probability is that we will have to contract our line to- 
night You will be required to hold, if possible, the Boydton 
Plank-Road and to Gravelly Run. Humphreys and Ord along the 
run; be prepared to do this on short notice. 

In answer General Warren sent the following : — 
8:40 p. m., March 31, 1865. 
Genl. Webb, C 'h 'f. Staff : . 

The line along the plank road is very strong. One division 
with my artillery, I think can hold it. .If we are not threatened 
south of Gravelly Run, east of the plank road, Genl. Humphreys 
and my batteries, I think, could hold this securely and let me 
move down and attack the enemy at Dinwiddie on one side and 
Sheridan on the other. From Bartlett <s position they will have 
to make a considerable detour to re-enforce their troops at that 
point from the north. . 

Unless Sheridan has been too badly handled 1 think we /mi e 
a chance for an open field fight that should be made use of. 

Resp'lv. G.K.Warren. 

At 8.50 p. m. General Meade received instruc- 
tions from General Grant to draw the Fifth Corps 
back to its position on the Boydton Road and send, 
at once, a division of the corps down that road to 
the relief of General Sheridan. At 9.17 p. m. General 
Warren received from General Meade his orders lor 
drawing back, and instructions to send General Grif- 
fin's division to General Sheridan. At 9.35 p. m. 



35 

the orders were issued to the divisions of the corps. 
At 9.50 p. m. General Warren was notified that the 
division intended for General Sheridan's relief should 
start at once. At 10 p. m. he reported to General 
Meade the conditions of the withdrawal of his com- 
mand from the White Oak Road, and that, in order 
to save time, General Ajres's division would be sent 
to Dinwiddie Court House in place of General Grif- 
fin's. At 10.15 p. m. General Meade confirmed this 
substitution of General Ayres for General Griffin, hav- 
ing in the mean time sent the 9.45 p. rn. despatch 
to General Grant, suggesting the movement indi- 
cated without reference to General Warren's des- 
patch of 8.40 p. m. — probably on account of Gen- 
eral Grant's known prejudice against that officer. 

Details have here been given in order to show the 
character of the record ignored by General Sheridan. 
That record shows that General Griffin's division 
was not "sent by Warren to the Boydton Road to 
protect his rear", as stated by General Sheridan, but 
that, on the contrary, General Bartlett's brigade of 
that division was kept in position to threaten the 
rear of the enemy confronting General Sheridan until 
withdrawn in compliance with peremptory orders 
from General Grant, and further, that, at the very 
time General Grant was issuing his order obliging 
that withdrawal, General Warren was suggesting to 
General Meade the proposition imperfectly quoted 
by General Sheridan as evidence that Generals Grant 
and Meade realized and appreciated the rare oppor- 
tunity that had been placed within their reach by 
the Parthian x tactics of the cavalry commander. All 

i. On page 169, Vol. 2, General Sheridan, again referring to his repulse on this 
same March 31, states: "the turn of events finally brought me the Fifth after my 
cavalry, under the most trying difficulties, had drawn the enemy from his works, 
■ ■ ■" but in his sworn statement, submitted in writing to the Warren Court of In- 
quiry (Record, page 51), he expresses it: "During the 31st of March, my cavalry had 
been driven back from Five Forks to within a short distance of Dinwiddie Court 
House. . ." 



36 



know how difficult is the task for human nature to 
acknowledge magnanimity in one it has injured and 
aspersed, but could General Sheridan have grasped 
the opportunity here offered to his hand, beyond all 
question he would have shown far higher general- 
ship than that ascribed to him by General Grant 
when, confronted by General Pickett in a broken and 
wooded country, "he deployed his cavalry on foot, 
leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of 
the horses." 

General Sheridan quotes in full his well known 
despatch to General Warren, dated April 1, 1865, 3 
a. m. The first thing to be noted in connection with 
this despatch is that it is an order addressed to a 
corps commander who was moving under the per- 
sonal command of Major-General Meade. This was 
acknowledged by General Sheridan before the court 
of inquiry, (Record pp. 71, 80. ), and one cannot but 
contrast this last reproduction of the order with his 
statements in regard to the command of the Cavalry 
Corps of the Army of the Potomac on, and just prior 
to, May 8, 1864. 

The next point to be noted is that the despatch 
was dated "3 a. m.", and that it was received by 
General Warren at 4.50 a. m., as admitted (Record, 
p. 200) by the officer who carried the order for Gen- 
eral Sheridan. General Sheridan says that he "never 
once doubted that measures would be taken to com- 
ply with" his despatch, when the record shows that 
it was neither delivered nor written in time to make 
compliance possible. In connection with this, Gen- 
eral Meade's despatch to General Grant dated 
April 1, 6 a. m., is of interest. It commences: "The 
officer sent to Sheridan returned between 2 and 3 a. 
m. without any written communication, but giving 



37 



General Sheridan 1 s opinion that the enemy were re- 
tiring from his 'front. . ." This was substantially 
acknowledged by General Sheridan ( Record, p. 79 ) 
and shows that, as a matter of fact, he concurred in 
the opinion expressed in General Warren's despatch 
of 8.20 p. m. just quoted. 

General Sheridan states : "As a matter of fact, 
when Pickett was passing the all-important point 
Warren's men were just breaking from the bivouac 
in which their chief had placed them the night be- 
fore, . ." The record — printed daily with special 
reference to General Sheridan's convenience and bene- 
fit — shows that General Pickett's troops began to 
retire soon after midnight (Record, pp. 421, 485, 497, 
511, et al.) in consequence of General Bartlett's 
movement upon their left and rear, and that, with 
the exception of the rear guard, they were in their 
lines at Five Forks soon after sunrise on April 1. 

General Sheridan says : " By 2 o'clock in the after- 
noon Merritt had forced the enemy inside his in- 
trenchments." The record shows that the Confed- 
erate infantry lines were formed about Five Forks 
before 9 a. m., and that they were practically unmo- 
lested in their work of strengthening their lines until 
the attack at 4 o'clock p. m. General Sheridan has 
offered no explanation of the fact that, by his order, 
(Record p. 21) 12,000 infantry halted for six hours, 
five miles in time, and two and one half miles in dis- 
tance, to the rear, and allowed this work to proceed. 
That six hours halt was certainly not General War- 
ren's blunder. 

The imputation of unnecessary delay in the 
movement of the Filth Corps, when at last it was 
ordered to the front, is repeated by General Sheridan. 



38 



It is enough here to quote the words of General War- 
ren's counsel, Mr. Stickney : — 

On this point a charge against Warren is a charge against 
the chief officers of his corps. . . The commanders of Warren s 
divisions and brigades were men who had been well tried. They 
were men who could be safely trusted to bring their commands up 
for that attack. 

The finding of the court confirms the statement. 
General Sheridan states (Vol. 2. p. 162) that, 
though he did not know how far toward Hatcher's 
Run the refused left of the enemy's works extended, 
he "did know where the refusal began," and that this 
-return" was the point he wished to assail. It was 
in evidence before the court of inquiry, and acknowl- 
edged by General Sheridan (Record, pp. 96, 97, 99, 
115) that he instructed General Warren, when form- 
ing his troops for assault, that the "return" was m 
the near vicinity of the intersection of the Gravelly 
Run Church Road and the White Oak Road. Devel- 
opments proved, however, that the "return" was be- 
tween seven and eight hundred yards west of that 
intersection, and General Ayres (Record, pp. 257, 
266 270) testifies in the most precise manner that, 
after his change of direction to meet the fire from the 
"return" General Sheridan came to him "some three 
times at short intervals and expressed the same fear, 
that he [I] had changed his [my] front too soon, 
and was engaging the cavalrv instead of the enemy; 
that he [I] had changed it before he [I] got suffi- 
ciently far north: 1 

Continuing his account (p. 163), General Sheri- 
dan states that the deflection of General Crawford s 
division "which finally brought it out on the Ford 
Road near C. Young's house, frustrated the purpose 
he [I] had in mind when ordering the attack. On 
the preceding page he states : — 



39 



I therefore intended that Ayres and Crawford should attack 
the refused trenches squarely, and when these two divisions and 
Merritt's cavalry became hotly engaged, Griffin 's division was to 
pass around the left of the Confederate line; and I personally in- 
structed Griffin how I wished him to go in, . . 

It is difficult to understand how General Sheri- 
dan's purpose was "frustrated" when, as a result of 
the erroneous information given by General Sheridan 
concerning the location of the "return", the division 
of General Griffin was moved by General Warren's 
order from its place in reserve to the right of General 
Ayres's division, and General Warren, then over- 
taking the diverging division of General Crawford, 
performed with it the very movement General Sheri- 
dan has put such stress upon. It is unnecessary to 
comment upon General Sheridan's issuing instruc- 
tions to a division commander of the Fifth Corps 
when the corps commander was present and actively 
engaged iu his duties, further than to again recall 
how bitterly he himself resented the fact that his 
commanding officer, General Meade, issued orders to 
two divisions of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of 
the Potomac when the commander of that corps 
was absent from duty on the night of May 7, 1864. 

General Sheridan has seen fit again to arraign 
General Warren's manner. As to that manner while 
forming his troops for the assault, it is enough to re- 
fer to the testimony of General Joshua L. Chamberlain 
(Record, p. 236) who knew General Warren long and 
well, and who states that at Gravelly Run Church 
he held the manner of a man intensely occupied but 
energetic. As to his manner in the battle, it is suffi- 
cient to quote the words of his counsel (Record, pp. 
1398-9) as addressed to the court that had before 
it the full testimony in the case, and that sustained 
the counsel by its verdict. Says Mr. Sticknev :— 



40 



At one time on that field a question was asked, "Where is 
Warren?" Where was he not? is a question which might be 
asked and to which no answer can be given. At every point of 
the battle field, at the precise place where he could be of service, at 
the pi'ecise time when he could be of service, by some strange 
chance he was at hand. Was it a chance ? Or is it the fact that 
one man on that field had a keen e3'e to seize a situation, and a 
keen mind to devise the measures to meet it ? Although many of 
the witnesses here testify that they did not see their own division 
commanders at any time during the entire day, yet so it is that 
nearly every single man of them saw Warren. His own evidence 
as to his movements on that field can be thrown out of this case, 
except that it is a string on which to connect the events given us by 
other witnesses ; and we could get his movements from the stories 
of other witnesses. At every point his testimony is confirmed bj r 
other witnesses, if it needed confirmation. 

This statement of the case is also supported by 
the argument of Major Gardner, counsel for General 
Sheridan, who (Record, p. 1538) attempts to make 
General Warren's undeniable activity the basis of a 
charge of "great indecision in his movements.^ 

In view of the persistent arraignment of General 
Warren in this particular, some consideration of 
General Sheridan's manner and method, as establish- 
ed before the court of inquiry, is certainly admissible. 
In his evidence (Record, p. 94) we find the follow- 
ing.:— 

y. I will ask you the question : Had you at that time any 
prejudice against General Warren ? — A. No, sir. 

Q. His reputation was that of an efficient officer, was it 
not? — A. I don't know what his reputation was; I had not 
served with him especially. 

In the testimony of General Chamberlain (Rec- 
ord, p. 234) we find a strange commentary on this :— 

Q. Were you at the head of the column ? — A. I was. 

Q. About what hour in the morning was it when you met 
General Sheridan? — A. I think it was seven o'clock. 

Q. What was the conversation? — A. . . General Sheridan 
asked me where General Warren was. I told him I understood 
him to be at the rear of the column with the rear division. 



41 



Q. Give the whole conversation, the words, as accurately as 
you can ? — A. The general made a reply which showed that he 
was annoyed. 

Q. I want the words ? — A. He said, "Thatis where I should 
expect him to be", or words to that effect. 

For sake of brevity we quote again the words of 
Mr. Stickney ( Record, pp. 1404-6 ) addressed to the 
court. Says Mr. Stickney : — 

Now, the most singular feature of this whole case, the most 
remarkable point in it, is the fact that a witness comes here and 
says : "Although I was in command of the United States forces 
in the field on that day, I saw only the attack of General Ayres 
on that earthwork at the end ; I know nothing of Griffin's move- 
ments ; I know nothing of Crawford 's movements ; 1 do not know 
that Crawford became engaged with Munford, or that he had any 
fighting at any point in the woods; I do not know any thing' of 
what the commander of the Fifth Corps did during the operations 
of that day; and I cannot give" — for those are his words — "J 
cannot give any account of my own personal movements after 
Ayres's assault. Yet I have had the glory of that da}' for sixteen 
years. And I still claim it ! " 

After reference to pages 120-128 of the Record, 
in substantiation, he continues : — 

If ever a soldier in military history has taken such a position 
before, it is beyond my knowledge. If any enemy of General 
Sheridan should tell such a story against him no one would credit 
it; but it is the statement of the man himself as to his own move- 
ments, made before a military court. And there we must leave 
him. 

We find further, in General Sheridan's testimony 
(Record, pp. 100-1): — 

Q. And what do you claim was Warren's sin of omission or 
commission in relation to that going off to the right? — A. If 
there was anybody in the wide world that should have made an 
effort to prevent that, General Warren was the man. 

Q. Undoubtedly. Now do you know whether he made any 
effort or not? — A. I don 't know. I did not realize any. 

Q. Did you ask him what he had clone? — A. I could not 
find him. 

Q- Did you ask him afterwards when you did find him ? — A. 
No, sir. 



42 

Q. Did you ask any one at the time you relieved him ? — A. No, 
sir. 

Q. Did you try to get any information of any one at the 
time you relieved him ? — A. No, sir; I had all I wanted. 

Turning now to page 366 of the Record, we find 
the testimony of General Fred. T. Locke, Assistant Ad- 
jutant-General Fifth Army Corps, as to his interview 
with General Sheridan on the White Oak Road near 
Five Forks, while General Warren was pushing- for- 
ward with his troops toward the Gilliam Held and 
to the assault of the last lines attempted to be held 
by the enemy : — 

Q. Did you report to General Sheridan ? — A. I gave him the 
message which General Warren had directed me to give him. 

Q. Give your words as nearly as you can. — A. That we 
had gained the enemy's rear, and had taken over 1.500 prisoners, 
and that he was pushing in a division as rapidly as he could. 

Q. Give Sheridan's answer. — A. General Sheridan turned 
around on his horse, he raised his right hand in this manner, and 
says: "Tell General Warren, by G — / I say he was not at the 
front. That is all I have got to say to him." 

Q. Did he give you any orders or instructions for General 
Warren ? — A. Not a word. 

Q. What was his manner ? — A. Very excited. 

General Locke wrote in his note book the words 
of General Sheridan's reply to General Warren's mes- 
sage, and confirmed his memorandum by reference 
to Captain Melcher who was present at the inter- 
view. Further comment on General Sheridan's man- 
ner would seem to be unnecessary. 

One other point, however, should be briefly no- 
ted in the words of Mr. Stickney : — 

General Sheridan's statement is that this resolution to relieve 
General Warren was taken by him after the battle was over 
[Memoirs. Vol. 2, p. 165], in view of the new conditions that 
arose at the end of the engagement. We have the testimony of 
Colonel Brinton [Record, p. 303] to the effect that, in the Sydnor 
field, when the action was not more than one hour in progress. 
General Sheridan met General Griffin; that he shouted out the 



43 



question, "Where is Warren?" Without waiting for an answer, 
he turned to General Griffin and said , "General Griffin, I put you 
in command of the Fifth corps." That is confirmed by .General 
Chamberlain's testimony [Record, pp. 277—8] in the most explicit 
manner. 

It is also supported by General Griffin's official 
report of April 29, 1865. 

Space allows but little further reference to Gener- 
al Sheridan's Memoirs. He says : — 

Years after the war, in 1879, a Court of Inquiry was given 
General Warren in relation to his conduct on the day of the bat- 
tle Briefly stated, in my report of the battle of Five 

Forks there were four imputations concerning General Warren. 
The first implied that Warren failed to reach me on the 1st of 
April, when I had reason to expect him ; the second, that the 
tactical handling of his corps was unskilful; the third, that he 
did not exert himself to get his corps up to Gravelly Run Church ; 
and the fourth, that when portions of his line gave way he did 
not exert himself to restore confidence to his troops. The court 
found against him on the first and second counts, and for him on 
the third and fourth. 

He concludes his remarks with the assertion that 
his course with regard to General Warren is plainly 
justifiable in the view of all who are disposed to be 
fair-minded, and quotes from General Sherman's re- 
view of the Proceedings of the Warren Court, words 
with which he is convinced the judgment of history 
will accord. 

This conclusion calls for a reference, as brief as 
possible, to General Warren's repeated applications 
for redress, and the results that followed. 

On page 170 of Benet's Military Law and 
Courts-martial, we find : — 

The articles of war contain full authority for protecting the 
rights and interests of inferiors, by giving to all officers and sol- 
diers the right of appeal, and requiring superiors, in positive and 
unequivocal terms, to follow certain prescribed modes for the 
doing justice to the appellant. 

And again on page 176 : — 



44 



This is the only case — the redressing of wrongs — in which an 
appeal can be made to a higher tribunal, under the articles of 
war; thus exhibiting special jealousy for the rights of inferior 
officers and soldiers, by making in their favor a marked exception 
to the ordinary course of military trials. 

Following the letter of the law, the aggrieved 
party must first make due application for redress 
to his commanding officer. General Warren received 
the order of General Sheridan relieving him from the 
command of the Fifth Army Corps and directing him 
to report to General Grant, at 7 p. m. April 1, 1865. 
Before leaving the field, General Warren made per- 
sonal application to General Sheridan for a reconsid- 
eration of the order. On the testimony of General 
Sheridan's own aide (Record p. 1058) that officer's 
answer was: "Reconsider? H — / / don't recon- 
sider my determination.''' 1 This, of course, relieved 
General Warren from the necessity of further refer- 
ence to General Sheridan. On April 9, 1865, how- 
ever, he appealed (Record, pp. 13-17) to General 
Grant for a court of inquiry. General Grant re- 
plied : "It is impossible at this time to give the court 
and witnesses necessary for the investigation." 
Early in 1866, General Warren again urged the mat- 
ter upon General Grant's attention, through the per- 
sonal efforts of Senator E. D. Morgan. General 
Grant again declined "on account of expenses of 
court, witnesses etc." On May 1, 1866, General 
Warren made application to the President of the 
United States, but without result, although Mr. 
Stanton at first promised that the request should be 
granted. Because of his positive decision upon the 
applications already made, no further effort was 
put forth during the presidency of General Grant, but 
on November 18, 1879, General Warren again urged 
his suit through the Hon. Geo. W. McCrary, Secre- 



4-5 



tarv of War. This application was endorsed as fol- 
lows : — 

Headquarters of the Army, 

Washington, D. C, Dec. 2, 1879. 

The Hon. Secretary of War having asked my opinion of the 

enclosed appeal, I mast say that the long-endured imputations on 

the fair fame of General Warren warrants the court of inquiry he 

has repeatedly asked for, and which has thus far been denied him. 

W. T. Sherman, 

General. 

On December 9, 1879, the order convening the 

court was issued by the Adjutant-General. 

The opinions of that court, as finally laid before 
the President of the United States, are as follows : — 

REJPORT. 

The First Imputation is found in an extract from General 
Grant's report, on page 1137 of the report of the Honorable Secre- 
tary of War to the first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress, as 
follows ( see, also, Record, p. 18 ) : 

"On the morning of the 31st, General Warren reported favor- 
ably to getting possession of the White Oak Road, and was direct- 
ed to do so. To accomplish this, he moved with one division in- 
stead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in 
superior force and driven back on the second division before it had 
time to form, and it in turn forced back upon the third division; 
when the enemy was checked. A division of the Second Corps was 
immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with 
heavy loss, and possession of the White Oak Road gained." 

OPINION. 
There seems to be no evidence that General Warren, on the 
morning of March 31, or at any other time, reported favorably 
to getting possession of the White Oak Road except in his des- 
patch ( V ) of 1 p. m., March 30, ah'eady referred to, and the move- 
ment suggested in that was practically set aside by General 
Grant 's despatch ( yiii ) of March 30, hei-etofore epioted. Gen- 
eral Warren's report, in his despatch ( lxxxiv ) of 9:4-0 a. m., 
March 31, quoted above, that he had given orders to drive the 
enemy 's pickets off the White Oak Road or develop what force of 
the enemy held it, could not be fairly construed as being able to 
take possession of it. 



46 



With regard to that portion of the imputation contained m 
the statement that General Warren W as directed to take possess- 
Tn ofthe White Oak Road, the following despatch from General 
Meade is the only one that can bear that constructs : 

"LXXXV. 

"U. S. M. T. 

Hdqurs. Armies U. S. 
" Nmmn - "10:30 a. m., Mar. 31, 1865. 

"To Mai. Gen. G.K.Warren: 

"Your despatch giving Ayres's position is received. Gen 1. 
Meade directs hat should you determine by your jeconnorssance 
Sat you can get possession of and hold the White Oak Road, 
^ are to do lo, Notwithstanding the order^to suspend opera- 
tions to-day. -Bv't. M. G., C. of S." 

And the evidence before the court shows that this order was 
not received by General Warren till after the fighting that resulted 
from the attempted reconnoissance had begun. 

It s in evidence by Ayres's and Crawford s testimony that 
General Warren had in his advance two demons though the 
tlst mony does not clearly show how long before the attack oi 
the enemv upon Avres the division of Crawford reached him. 

Grffin's clivison was held in reserve along the branch o 
l>JelWR«« nearest to and northwest from the Boydton Plank 
Road L^tZy have been so held to carry out the rntenUons 
Inte Zovring 'despatch from General Meade's head.uarters : 



"LXXIX. 



" N — 8 " 32 " ™- ..Hd q « M A T of P., 8.25, Mar. 31, 1865. 

com'd'g desires you be ready to send your reserve, if it should 
called for, to support Humphreys. 

"There will be no movement of troops to-day. ^ ^^ 

r ™ ,. "B. M. G." 

"Rec. 8.40 a. m— G. K. W. 

The court is further of the opinion that, considering the Fifth 



47 



morning so do to, which, however, does not appear in the evi- 
dence. 

SECOND IMPUTATION. 

The Second Imputation is found in the following extract from 
General Sheridan's report of May 15, 1865 (See Record, pp. 21 
and 48), as follows: 

" . . . . had General Warren moved according to the ex- 
pectations of the Lieutenant-General, there would appear to have 
been but little chance for the escape of the enemy's infantry in 
front of the Dinwiddie Court House." 



OPINION. 
It is supposed that "the expectations of the lieutenant-gener- 
al," referred to in this imputation, are those expressed in his des- 
patch to General Sheridan of 10.45 p. m. of March 31, 1865, as 

follows : 

"clxxix. 

"Dabney's Mills, 
"March 31, 1865 — 10.45 p. m. 
"Major-General Sheridan: 

"The 5th Corps has been ordered to } T our support. Two di- 
visions will go by J. Boisseau's and one down the Boydton Road. 
In addition to this 1 have sent Mackenzie's cavalry, which will 
reach } r ou by the Vaughan Road. All these forces, except the cav- 
alry, should reach you by 12 to-night. 

You will assume command of the whole force sent to operate 
with you and use it to the best of your ability to destn^ the force 
which your command has fought so gallantly to-day. 

"U. S. Grant, 
"Lieutenant- General." 

In which he says, "All these forces, except the cavahy, should 
reach you by 12 to-night." If this supposition be correct, the court 
is of opinion, considering the condition of the roads and surround- 
ing country over part of which the troops had to march, the 
darkness of the night, the distance to be traveled, and the hour at 
which the order for the march reached General Warren, 10.50 p. 
m., that it was not practicable for the Fifth Corps to have reached 
General Sheridan at 12 o'clock on the night of March 31. 

Notwithstanding that dispositions suitable for the contin- 
gency of Sheridan's falling back from Dinwiddie might well have ' 
occupied and perplexed General Warren's mind during the night, i / 
the court is of the opinion that he should have moved the two di-j ! 
visions by the Crump Road in obedience to the orders and expec- 
tations of his commander, upon whom alone rested the responsi-* 
bility of the consequences. 



48 



It appears from the despatches and General Warren's testi- 
mony, that neither Generals Meade, Sheridan, or Warren expressed 
an intention of having this column attack before daylight. 

The court is further of the opinion that General Warren 
should have started with two divisions, as directed by General 
Meade's despatch ( CIV, heretofore quoted ), as early after its re- 
ceipt, at 10,50 p. m., as he could be assured of the prospect of A}'- 
res's departure down the Boydton Plank Road, and should have 
advanced on the Crump Road as far as directed in that despatch, 
or as far as might.be practicable or necessary to fulfill General 
Meade's intention ; whereas the evidence shows that he did not 
start until between five and six o'clock on the morning of the 1st 
of April, and did not reach J. Boisseau's with the head of the 
column until about seven o'clock in the morning. 

The despatches show that Generals Meade and Warren anti- 
cipated a withdrawal during the night of the . enemy's forces 
fronting General Sheridan, which was rendered highly probable 
from the known position in their rear of a portion of the Fifth 
Corps ( Bartlett's Brigade ) at G. Boisseau's, and the event justi- 
fied the anticipation. 

THIRD IMPUTATION. 

The Third Imputation is found in an extract from General 
Sheridan's report of May 16, 1865 (see Record, pages 21 and 48), 
as follows : 

"... General Warren did not exert himself to get up his 
corps as rapidly as he might have done, and his manner gave me 
the impression that he wished the sun to go down before disposi- 
tions for the attack could be completed." 

On the afternoon of April 1, the Fifth Corps was massed as 
follows: Crawford's and Griffin's divisions at the forks of the 
Crump Road and the main road from Dinwiddle Court House to 
Five Forks, and Ayres's division on the Brooke's Road about one- 
fourth of a mile east from the forks of that road and the road to 
Five Forks. 

The distance from the position of Griffin and Crawford to the 
place of formation of the Fifth Corps, near Gravelly Run Church, 
was about 2VL miles, and the length of the corps when spread out 
in column of route would be about 2% miles. The last file of the 
column required as much time to reach the place of formation as 
it would have taken to march about 5 miles. 

General Warren received his orders near Gravelly Run Church 
to move up his corps at 1 p. m., and it took some time to com- 
municate those orders to the divisions and for the movement to 
begin. 

The route to the place of formation was along a narrow 



49 



road, very mudch- and slippery, somewhat encumbered with wag- 
ons and led horses of the cavalry corps, and the men were fa- 
tigued. The testimony of brigade and division commanders is to 
the effect that the corps in line of march was well closed up, and 
that no unnecessary delay was incurred. 

The corps reached its destination, and was formed ready to 
advance against the enemy about 4 p. m. 

It is in evidence that General Warren remained near Gravelly 
Run Church, directing the formation, explaining the mode of at- 
tack to the division and brigade commanders, with sketches pre- 
pared for the purpose. 

General Warren also repeatedly sent out staff officers to the 
division commanders in order to expedite the march. 

OPINION. 

The court is of the opinion that there was no unnecessary de- 
lay in this march of the Fifth Corps, and that General Warren 
took the usual methods of a corps commander to prevent delay. 

The question regarding General Warren's manner appears to 
be too intangible and the evidence on it too contradictor)' for the 
court to decide, separate from the context, that he appeared to 
wish "the sun to go down before dispositions for the attack 
would be completed; " but his actions, as shown by the evidence, 
do not appear to have corresponded with such wish, if ever he 
entertained it. 

FOURTH IMPUTATION. 

The Fourth Imputation is found in an extract from General 
Sheridan's report of May 16, 1865 ( see Record, pp. 22 and 48 ), 
as follows : 

"During this attack I again became dissatisfied with General 
Warren. During the engagement portions of his line gave way 
when not exposed to a heavy fire, and simply from want of confi- 
dence on the part of the troops, which General Warren did not 
exert himself to inspire." 

When the Fifth Corps moved up to the attack, General Sher- 
idan said to General Ayres, " I will ride with you." General War- 
ren was on the left of Crawford's division, between Crawford and 
Ayres. 

When General Ayres's command struck the White Oak Road 
it received a fire in flank from the enemy's "return" nearly at 
right angles to the road. He changed front immediately at right 
angles and faced the "return," his right receiving a fire from Mini- 



50 



ford 's Confederate division of dismounted cavalry distributed 
along the edge of the woods to the north of the White Oak Road. 
There was some confusion, which was immediately checked by the 
exertions of General Sheridan, General Ayres, and other officers. 

The evidence shows that General Warren was observant of 
Ayres, because he sent orders to Winthrop's reserve brigade to 
form on the left of Ayres's new line. 

This necessary change of front of Ayres increased the in- 
terval between him and Crawford on his right; the latter was 
marching without change of direction until, as he expressed it, 
he would clear the right of Ayres, when he was also to change 
front to the left. 

At this moment, Warren, who saw that Crawford, with 
Griffin following, was disappearing in the woods to the north of 
the White Oak Road, sent a staff officer to Griffin to come as 
quickly as he could to sustain Ayres ; went himself to the left brig- 
ade of Crawford, and caused a line to be marked out facing to 
the west, directing the brigade commander to form on it; then 
went into the woods and gave orders to the right brigade of 
Crawford to form on the same line. When he returned to the 
open ground the brigade he had directed to change front, had dis- 
appeared, as appears by the evidence, in consequence of orders 
given by an officer of General Sheridan's staff. General Warren 
sent repeated orders by staff-officers to both Griffin and Craw- 
ford to change direction, and went himself to both, and finally by 
these means corrected, as far as was possible under the circum- 
stances, the divergence of these two divisions. 

It appears from evidence that these two divisions were oper- 
ating in the woods and over a difficult country, and received a 
fire in their front from the dismounted cavalry of Munford, 
posted in the woods to the north of the White Oak Road, which 
led to the belief for some time, that the enemy had a line of battle- 
in front; and this ma}- furnish one reason why it was so difficult 

at first to change their direction to the proper one. 

• 

OPINION. 
General Warren's attention appears to have been drawn, al- 
most immediately after Ayres received the flank fire from the "re- 
turn" and his consequent change of front, to the probability of 
Crawford with Griffin diverging too much from and being sepa- 
rated from Ayres, and by continuous exertions of himself and staff 
substantially remedied matters; and the court thinks that this 
■was for him the essential point to he attended to, which also ex- 
acted his whole efforts to accomplish. 



51 

When the delicacy of the position in which the 
court — consisting of but two members, who must 
concur — was placed by the necessity of expressing 
judicial opinions upon the statements of Generals 
Grant and Sheridan, is taken into consideration, 
nothing can be more explicit than those opinions as 
here given. It would be impossible to pronounce 
against the allegations of those officers in clearer or 
more courteous language. Concerning the criticisms 
of General Warren's personal movements on March 
31, and the movements of his divisions on the early 
morning of April 1, it is manifest from the opinions 
as expressed, and from details given in the reports, 
that the court, conscious that the death of General 
Meade had deprived General Warren of a most ma- 
terial witness, and fully recognizing the embarrass- 
ments under which he had been called to act, simply 
differed from General Warren in the conclusions he 
arrived at, and acted upon, in the discharge of his 
duty as corps commander during the absence of his 
superior from the front and that superior's conse- 
quent lack of full information as to the developing 
details of the field. General Humphreys (Ya. Cam- 
paign, p. 341 ) has said : — 

But General Warren should have moved with Griffin and 
Crawford as soon as practicable after receiving Meade's order at 
10.50 p. m., though it will be observed that subsequent to that 
hour General Meade subordinated all General Warren's efforts to 
ensuring- the presence of one of his divisions with General Sher- 
idan by daylight. 

There is, in neither case, any imputation cast 
upon General Warren's motives, efforts, or intelli- 
gence, but simply a difference of opinion as to prac- 
ticability and the necessities of the case. It is mani- 
fest that, while the death of General Meade rendered 
it impossible for General Warren to present direct 



52 



and positive evidence ' that his actions upon March 
31, and the night following, had been such as to 
satisfy the intentions and requirements of his su- 
perior and commanding officer, the facts, as es- 
tablished to the satisfaction of, and as stated by 
the court, and as indicated by General Humph- 
reys, all strongly support that hypothesis against 
which no evidence stronger than mere specula- 
tion has been produced, and General Alex. S. Webb, 
the last Chief of Staff of the Army of the Poto- 
mac — a witness of unquestionable competence and, 
on this point, second in authority only to General 
Meade himself — states positively to the writer: "I 
believe General Meade was satisfied with General 
Warren's movements March 31, to April 1. We who 
knew Warren felt that he would do his best to re- 
lieve Sheridan." 

The record of the proceedings of the court was 
submitted to the Honorable Robert T. Lincoln, Sec- 
retary of War, accompanied by a report from Briga- 
dier-General D. G. Swaim, Judge-Advocate General, 
U. S. Army, under date of July 11, 1882. That re- 
port is notoriously something far other than a legiti- 

i. General Meade's despatch to General Grant dated 6 a. m., April i, 1865 
(Record, p. 1254), concludes with the words, "Warren will be at or near Dinwiddie 
soon, with his whole corps, and will require further orders." The following despatch 
(Record, p. 1288) was received by Gensral Warren about g a. in. April 1: 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac. 

•' April 1, 6 a. m., 1864. 
" Maj. Gen. Warren : 

" Gen'l Meade directs that in the movements folloxuing your Junction with Gen'l 
Sheridan you will be uuder his orders, and will report to him. Please send a report of 
progress. 

"Alex. S. Webb, 

"B. M. G„ C. O. S." 
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, these despatches certainly indicate 
1l1.it General Warren — hrld under direct orders from General Meade :</> to o a. >u. 
April r — had met the intentions and expectations of his commanding officer, and 
had even exceeded, or anticipated, them when his whole corps had joined and report- 
ed to General Sheridan before 7 a. m. — two hours before the receipt of the 6 a. nv 
order sent by General Webb. 



53 

mate and legal review of the proceedings of the 
court. It is, in fact, an arbitrary re-trial of the case 
by the Judge- Advocate General in which General D. 
G. Swaim assumes to set aside and modify the find- 
ings and opinions of Generals C. C. Augur and John 
Newton. 

This brings us to the report of General Sherman, 
so confidently referred to by General Sheridan. After 
reciting a brief history of the case as it seems to ap- 
pear to him, General Sherman states that General 
Sheridan's action in relieving General Warren was 
sustained by General Grant and never questioned by 
either President Lincoln or President Johnson and 
that, " There the matter ought to have ended." 
General Sherman, however, could not but be aware 
that the action of Generals Grant and Sheridan has 
never yet received the presidential approval which 
alone could make it defensible and legal, and he 
neglects to state how it came that the matter was 
not brought to the attention ol Presidents Lincoln or 
Johnson ; and, further, the Articles of War, and his 
own endorsement upon General Warren's last, and 
successful, application for a court, do not sustain the 
reconsidered opinion he here expresses — on the report 
of the court becoming known. General Sherman 
states that the findings of the court "confirm sub- 
stantially what was officially reported on the dates 
of the occurrences," but this, and his preceding de- 
tailed statements to the same effect, are clearly de- 
nied by the court itself. 

General Sherman affirms "the patriotism, integ- 
rity, and great intelligence of General Warren," as 
"attested by a long record of most excellent service," 
but, with warning of dire results in future wars if 
General Sheridan is not "fully and entirely sustain- 



54 



ed," he endorses General Sheridan in a course that 
can be justified only on the assumption that General 
Warren was lacking in every trait conceded and, 
also, was what General Sheridan's counsel essayed 
to prove him — a scheming coward. 
General Sherman says : — 

It would be an unsafe and dangerous rule to hold the com- 
mander of an army in battle to a technical adherance to any rule 
of conduct for managing his command. He is responsible for re- 
sults and holds the lives and reputations of every officer and sol- 
dier under his orders as subordinate to the great end — victory. 

To understand that neither General Grant, nor 
General Sherman, nor General Sheridan believed this 
monstrous theory, one has but to recall their own 
words concerning Shiloh, Corinth, Raleigh and 
Todd's Tavern. The roar of battle absolves no offi- 
cer, from the commander-in-chief down, from obe- 
dience to the Constitution and to the Articles of 
War ; nor does it release him from the obligations of 
honor and justice in his own person ; still less does 
it place the reputation of any subordinate at his dis- 
posal , and to persist in wrong under such a plea is 
base. If the able argument made by General War- 
ren's counsel before the court of inquiry needed sup- 
port, or confirmation, where could they be better 
found than in this quaint appeal unto Caesarism, — 
this plea in confession and avoidance — upon which 
General Sheridan has rested his case ? 

The final endorsement upon the proceedings of 
the court of inquiry is as follows : — 

War Department, 

November 21, 1882. 

The foregoing proceedings and report having been laid before 
the President, he directs that the findings and opinions of the 
court of incpiiry be published. 

Robert T. Lincoln, 

Secretarv of War. 



55 



In professed compliance with that endorsement, 
a limited number of copies of the full proceedings and 
report of the court were printed and to a very lim- 
ited extent were distributed. At the same time, how- 
ever, a pamphlet containing the report and opinion 
of the court, together with the reports of the Judge- 
Advocate General and the General of the Army, was 
largely printed and widely distributed. And yet, we 
are told that military law and military courts are 
established for the purpose of u arriving at the truth, 
that there may not in any case, he a failure of jus- 
tice" ! 



56 



FIVE FORKS 

TO 

APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE. 



General Grant ( Mem. Vol. 2. p. 216 ) describes 
General Warren as " a gallant soldier, an able man ; 
and he was besides thoroughly imbued with the so- 
lemnity and importance of the duty he had to per- 
form". Afterwards, referring (p. 445) to the re- 
moval of General Warren from the command of the 
Fifth Army Corps, he says : — 

"Iwas so much dissatisfied with Warren's dilatory move- 
ments in the battle of White Oak Road and in his failure to reach 
Sheridan in time, that Iwas very much afraid that at the last mo- 
ment he would fail Sheridan. He was a man of tine intelligence, 
great earnestness, quick perception, and could make his disposi- 
tions as quickly as any officer, under difficulties where he was 
forced to act. Rut I had before discovered a defect which was be- 
yond his control, that was very prejudicial to his usefulness in 
emergencies like the one just before us. He could see every danger 
at a glance before he had encountered it. He would not only make 
preparations to meet the danger which might occur, but he would 
intorm his commanding officer what others shotild do while he 
was executing his move. 

I had sent a staff officer to General Sheridan to call his atten- 
tion to these defects, and to sa3 r that as much as I liked General 
Warren, now was not a time when we could let our personal feel- 
ings for any one stand in the way of success ; and if his removal 
was necessary to success, not to hesitate. It was upon that au- 



57 

thorization that Sheridan removed Warren. I was very sorry 
that it had been done, and regretted still more that I had not 
long before taken occasion to assign him to another field of duty. 

It is unnecessary to dwell upon General Grant's 
expression of regret that he had not sooner removed 
General Warren from the field where he had won his 
corps command, or to call attention to his sorrow 
over the adoption of his own suggestion. It is wor- 
thy of notice, however, that, when testifying under 
oath before the Warren Court of Inquiry, General 
Grant stated positively (Record, pp. 1028-1034) 
that his reasons for sending the authorization for re- 
moval to General Sheridan did not have reference to 
General Warren's conduct on March 31, or April 1, 
1865, but " to previous conduct." 1 While the sworn 
evidence thus emphatically denies the correctness of 
the later statement as to that point, it is evident 
that all recollection of the witness-stand had not es- 
caped the writer of the Memoirs, for in his testimony 
we find ( Record p. 1041) the interjected implication : 

But where officers undertook to think for themselves, and 
considered that the officer giving them orders had not fully con- 
sidered what everybody else was to do, it generally led to failure 
or delay. 

In consideration of the opinions expressed by the 
court of inquiry upon the allegations made against 
General Warren by Generals Grant and Sheridan; 
and in view of the facts, well established by the rec- 
ord of that court, that General Warren not only saw 
the dangers encountered by his command on March 
31, and April 1, 1865, but successfully met and over- 
came them, and, in addition, of his own soldierly vo- 
lition made such dispositions as materially aided 
General Sheridan to maintain himself under the re- 
verse he encountered upon March 31,— the record 
of General Warren may safely be left to maintain 



58 



his honor and ability against indefinite insinuations 
as "to previous conduct." Had that record not 
been practically unassailable, General Warren could 
not have maintained the command he held from 
May 4, 1864, to April 1, 1865. To this the Mili- 
tary History and Personal Memoirs of Lf. S. Grant 
bear witness, and the time and method of his re- 
moval from that command emphasize the involun- 
tary testimony. 

Constituted, as it was, solely for the consider- 
ation of General Warren's conduct, the investigation 
of the Warren Court of Inquiry was made upon the 
assumption, repeatedly stated and assented to by 
counsel for General Warren, that the appropriate- 
ness of the action of Generals Grant and Sheridan, 
and the sufficiency of their authority, were not to be 
questioned. That, as a matter of absolute fact, the 
assumption was at least debatable, is very clearly 
indicated by General Sherman's report and pleading 
upon the proceedings of the court. That the course 
pursued by the Lieutenant-General and the com- 
mander of the Army of the Shenandoah "does not 
occur frequently," is acknowledged by the evidence 
( Record, p. 93 ) of General Sheridan. 

The army exists by authority of the Constitu- 
tion of the United States. Under that authority, 
the President, by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, appoints and commissions all commis- 
sioned officers of the army. The resignation of offi- 
cers appointed by the President can be accepted by 
him alone, and, except in time of war, no officer can 
be dismissed from the army except by sentence ot 
court-martial approved by the President; and with- 
out his approval no sentence of a court-martial 
which affects a general officer is effective in time of 



59 

either peace or war. The transfer of officers from 
one regiment or corps to another can be made only 
by authority of the President, and "if, upon marches, 
guards, or in quarters, different corps of the same 
army shall happen to join, or do duty together, the 
officer highest in rank . , . there on duty or in 
quarters, shall command the whole, . . . unless 
otherwise specially directed by the President of the 
United States, according to the nature of the case." 
These powers, conferred by the Constitution upon 
the President alone, relate to the course of ordinary 
military proceedings. For special reasons and pecu- 
liar emergencies, still greater powers are entrusted 
to him — and to him alone. By Act of Congress, 
July 17, 1862, the President of the United States 
was "authorized and requested to dismiss and dis- 
charge from military service either in the army, 
navy, marine corps, or volunteer force, in the United 
States service, any officer for any cause which, in his 
judgment, either renders such officer unsuitable for, 
or whose dismission would promote, the public ser- 
vice," and in any time of war, to him alone, as Com- 
mander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States, belongs the right and duty of assigning com- 
manders to Army Corps, or Armies, in the field, and 
of removing them for cause sufficient in his judg- 
ment ; but neither the Constitution of the United 
States, nor the Articles of War, contain any author- 
ity for the delegation of any of these powers espe- 
cially entrusted to the President to any other officer 
of the government. That there are grave reasons 
why such power should be thus limited and guarded, 
scarce needs an argument. Commenting upon the 
subject of dismissals from the service "by order of 
the President," an undoubted authority ( Benet. 
Military Law and Courts-martial ) says : — 



60 

Much might be said on the ground of expediency, in opposi- 
tion to the rule and practice in this regard, but we will only re- 
mark, that the power of the President to remove officers from the 
army at his pleasure, might some day prove of greater danger to 
the liberties of the people, than the simple fact of keeping up a 
standing army. The right of appointing to office during the re- 
cess of the Senate, said appointments to hold until the end of the 
next session of Congress, gives to an unscrupulous executive a 
fearful power. The selection of political tools, to hold such posi- 
tions for many months, would suffice, under circumstances of 
great extremity, to work out direst evils to the republic. Such a 
power over an army cannot be too well guarded by all the checks 
which an enlightened jndgment can impose, and as an evil, is more 
to be dreaded than the perpetual tenure of officers' commissions, 
subject as they are to the close supervision of military tribunals. 

To exercise by proxy the powers entrusted solely 
to the President, would extend, rather than guard 
against, the evil indicated, and concerning a dele- 
gated authority to remove regularly assigned com- 
manders in the field, another high authority conden- 
ses the same reasoning into : — 

Given a general-in-chief — say Arnold who turned traitor — 
he can remove every corps or division commander, replace them 
with tools, and make treason a success. 

General Warren had for years honored a commis- 
sion in the army. Not even his traducers have de- 
nied that his service — in peace and war — as subord- 
inate or when in high command — was pre-eminently 
distinguished by zeal, fidelity, thoroughness, and in- 
telligence that neither fear nor favor could swerve 
from the line of truth and duty. In addition, history 
will record that the facts established by sworn testi- 
mony before the court of inquiry, sustain the state- 
ment that his only error as commander of the Fifth 
Army Corps at Five Forks lay in obeying General 
Sheridan's order relieving him from his command, 
and that even that error is not only palliated by the 
participation of his comrades, but heightens his re- 
nown — for it illustrates the devoted subordination 



61 



so characteristic of the Army of the Potomac, which 
will stand forever in refutation of puerile charges of 
jealousy. 

The following order is still on the files of the War 
Department, and unrevoked : — 

Order \ Adjutant-General's Office, 

No - 54 -J Washington, 13th August, 1829- 

The subjoined Regulation, approved by the President of the 

United States, has been received from the War Department, and 

is published for the information and government of all concerned. 

"regulation concerning rank and command. 

"6. An officer entrusted with the command of a post, detach- 
ment, guard, or separate command, will not surrender it to ano- 
ther, unless regularly relieved from the duty assigned him, except 
in case of sickness or inability to perform his duty, wben the offi- 
cer next in rank, present and on duty with such command, will 
succeed as a matter of course. 

" By command of the President : 

"John F. Eaton, 

" Secretary of War. 
" By Order of Alexander Macomb, 

" Major-General Commanding the Army : 



"Adjutant General." 
This order appears as paragraph 15 of General 
Regulations of 1841, and was repeated in General 
Order No. 5, March 12, 1846. It does not appear in 
set terms, however, in the succeeding Army Regula- 
tions, probably because it announces an axiomatic 
principle underlying the whole military system — 
that no one can resign a trust confided to him unless 
regularly relieved by competent authority. General 
Warren, therefore, should have demanded to see in 
writing the authority under which General Sheridan 
assumed to act, and competent authority not being 
thus presented, he, in loyal subordination to the su- 



62 

perior from whom he derived his own authority and 
had received his trust, should have declined to sur- 
render his command. The command of an army, or 
army corps, is no ordinary charge. Commanders 
assigned to such positions by the President, or sover- 
eign power, are presumed to possess additional quali- 
ties over and above the mere acquirement of techni- 
calities, or simple personal gallantry, and only the 
power conferring can relieve from the grave responsi- 
bilities of such a trust. Possibly, to meet great em- 
ergencies, the President might grant to a general-in- 
chief, the right to remove or replace a corps com- 
mander, subject to report without delay for his con- 
firmation or disapproval, but there can be no au- 
thority, or right, involved to delegate the power still 
further, — least of all, to one holding equal rank as 
corps commander, and by verbal authorization so 
vague and general that neither the author nor the 
recipient (Record, pp. 55, 93, 901, 1028) retain a 
definite recollection of the form. 

It would seem, therefore, that General Sherman's 
plea for relief from the restraints of "any rule of con- 
duct" was somewhat urgently needed in the attempt 
to sustain the assumption of presidential authority 
shown by the removal of General Warren and the 
assignment of General Griffin to the corps command 
over General Crawford, a senior division com- 
mander present and on duty with the corps. The 
supposition that any emergency called for such an 
exercise of illegal power cannot be maintained. Le- 
gitimate means were available, and ample for all 
necessities. If General Sheridan was satisfied that 
General Warren had in any way failed in his duty on 
April 1, 1865, he had it rightfully in his power, as 
commanding officer, to order General Warren to re- 



63 



port in arrest to his army commander, General 
Meade. In that event, however, General Warren 
could not have been denied an immediate hearing be- 
fore a tribunal of his peers. 

It is scarcely necessary to comment on the gratu- 
itous discourtesy to the commander of the Army of 
the Potomac, involved in the method adopted. 

General Grant has gravely recorded that General 
Warren's intelligence, activity, and prevision, in con- 
nection with his subordination in carefully reporting 
to his superiors the developments of the field as they 
presented themselves and his judgment as to the 
means that best could meet those developments, 
were "very prejudical to his usefulness in emergen- 
cies." The acknowledged intelligence of General 
Grant precludes the possibility of accepting as sin- 
cere—save as an involuntary confession of incorrigi- 
ble prejudice — the suggestion, thus made, that the 
very qualities pre-eminently requisite in a corps com- 
mander could be prejudicial to his usefulness when 
guided by an earnest loyalty such as all accord to 
General Warren. That General Grant himself, as a 
matter of fact, attached but little importance to the 
charges he insinuates against General Warren — save 
as they might affect the credulous public mind — is 
fully evidenced, not only by his intelligence, but also 
by his Military History and Personal Memoirs 
aided by the Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan. 
The last named work has certainly made clear the 
fact, indicated on the pages of the preceding works, 
that, in General Sheridan's case when in command 
of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac 
from May 4, to May 7, 1864, General Grant not 
only sustained, but even rewarded, that officer for 



64 



exercising the right of thinking for himself and of re- 
flecting upon his commander to an extent that even 
a moderate rendering of military law and ethics can 
class only as closely bordering upon open, mutiny. 
Again — on pages 436-7 of his second volume, Gen- 
eral Grant relates the dissatisfaction of General 
Sheridan at the order he ( General Grant ) had issued 
for the movements of March 29, 1865, because he 
believed himself to be therein ordered "to cut loose 
again from the Army of the Potomac" (the very or- 
der to secure which he had revolted against the com- 
mand of General Meade ten months before), and 
that he ( General Grant ) followed and, in a private 
conversation, pacified his discontented subordinate 
by confidential explanations. 

General Sheridan now makes the point even 
clearer still. On pages 112 and 113 of his second 
volume, referring to his Shenandoah Valley campaign 
of February, 1865, he says : — 

Grant's orders were for me to destroy the Virginia Central 
Railroad and the James River Canal, capture Lynchburg if prac- 
ticable, and then join General Sherman in North Carolina wher- 
ever he might be found, or return to Winchester, but as to join- 
ing Sherman I was to be governed by the state of affairs after the 
projected capture of Lynchburg. 

Then, on page 119, he states: — 

Being thus unable to cross until the r/ver should fall, and 
knowing that it was impracticable to join General Sherman, and 
useless to adhere to my alternative instructions to return to Win- 
chester, I now decided to destroy still more thoroughlj r the James 
River Canal and the Virginia Central Railroad and then join Gen- 
eral Grant in front of Petersburg. I was master of the whole 
country north of the James as far down as Goochland ; hence the 
destruction of these arteries of supply could be easily compassed, 
and feeling that the war was nearing its end, I desired my cavalry 
to he in at the death. 

On page 124, he continues : — 

The transfer of mv command from the Shenandoah Vallcv to 



65 



the field of operations in front of Petersburg was not anticipated 
by General Grant, indeed, the despatch brought from Columbia 
by my scouts, asking that supplies be sent me at the White House, 
was the first -word that reached him concerning the more. In 
view of my message the general-in-chief decided to wait my ar- 
rival before beginning spring operations with the investing troops 
south of the James river, for he felt the importance of having my 
cavalry at hand in a campaign which he was convinced would 
wind up the war. We remained a few days at the White House 
. . . . When all was ready the column set out for Hancock 
Station, . . and arriving there on the 27th of March, was in 
orders reunited with its comrades of the Second Division 
The reunited corps was to enter upon the campaign as a separate 
army, I reporting directly to General Grant; the intention being 
thus to reward me for foregoing, of my own choice, my position 
as a department commander by joining the armies at Peters- 
burg. 

On page 127, he states that when he met and re- 
ported to General Grant at City Point, the general- 
in-chief closed the conversation upon the Shenan- 
doah Campaign "with the remark that it was rare 
a department commander voluntarily deprived him- 
self of independence, and added that I should not 
suffer for it." Continuing, in succeeding pages, he re- 
lates that, after reading a general letter of instruc- 
tions prepared by General Grant for the coming- 
movement, he showed plainly that he was dissatis- 
fied with it, and immediately began to offer his 
objections to the programme in a somewhat empha- 
tic manner, and that, when he had finished, General 
Grant quietly told him that the portions of the in- 
structions to which he objected were only "a blind." 
On pages 132-3, relating the interview between Gen- 
eral Grant, General Sherman, and himself, on the 
night of March 27, he states : — 

. . . I made no comments on the projects for moving his 
own ( General Sherman's ) troops, but as soon as opportunity of- 
fered, dissented emphatically from the proposition to have me join 
the Army of the Tennessee, repeating in substance what I had 



66 



previously expressed to General Grant. My uneasiness made jne 
somewhat too earnest, I fear, but General Grant soon mollified 
me, and smoothed matters over ... so I pursued tbe subject 
no farther. 

The details thus given by General Sheridan are 
substantially sustained by Generals Grant and Ba- 
deau. 

It remains, therefore, that General Grant reward- 
ed the insubordination of General Sheridan at Spott- 
sylvania Court House by detaching him from the 
command of General Meade ; that he again rewarded 
him, by changing for his benefit the Cavalry Corps 
of the Army of the Potomac into the independent 
command entitled "the army of the Shenandoah," 
after he (General Sheridan) had decided for himself 
that it was useless to adhere to the instructions un- 
der which he had been operating in the Shenandoah 
Valley, and had — in defiance of rules and articles of 
war — withdrawn his command from the depart- 
ment to which he had been assigned without any 
more urgent necessity than that, "feeling that the 
war was nearing its end, he [I] desired his [my] 
cavalry to be in at the death ; " and that, finally, he 
"mollified" the same officer's emphatic discontent 
and objection to the duties to which his command 
might possibly be assigned, by concessions in his fav- 
or. While General Sheridan boasts, and General 
Grant admits, such facts, one can scarcely credit 
with much of dignity the efforts of the last Generals 
of the U. S. Army to justify the arbitrary removal 
of General Warren from the command he graced, and 
from participation in the final triumph of the cause 
to which he had devoted the best years of his un- 
selfish, earnest life. 

With regard to the sending of General Miles to 



67 



General Sheridan on the night of April 1-2, General 
Grant states in his report : — 

Some apprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might de- 
sert his lines during the night, and by falling upon General Sheri- 
dan before assistance could reach him, drive him from his positio:i 
and open the way for retreat. To guard against this, General 
Miles's division of Humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him, 
and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four 
o'clock in the morning ( April 2 ), when an assault was ordered 
on the enemy's lines. 

General Humphreys's report states that, in com- 
pliance with orders from General Grant, at 5.30 p. 
m., April 1, he advanced General Miles's division, not 
only toward, but across the White Oak Road, and 
held the road in force, and that ( by General Grant's 
order), soon after midnight, finding the enemy's lines 
in his front too strong to be broken, he sent General 
Miles down the White Oak Road to reinforce General 
Sheridan. 

After the close of the engagement at Five Forks, 
two divisions of the Fifth Corps were posted for the 
night across the White Oak Road near Gravelly Run 
Church, and the third was put in position upon the 
Ford Road. Mackenzie's division of cavalry was 
left at the Ford Road crossing of Hatcher's Run, 
and the remainder of the cavalry ( the Army of the 
Shenandoah ) was held at and near Five Forks. 

The extreme right of the Confederate intrenched 
lines rested upon Hatcher's Run, in timber, and 
about a third of a mile west of the Claiborne Road. 
Thence they extended to the left, crossing the Clai- 
borne and White Oak roads just east of the forks, 
and covering the latter road to its junction with the 
Boydton Plank road, which they crossed, and again 
rested upon Hatcher's Run east of Burgess's Mill. 
The confronting lines of the Second Corps held close 



68 



up to these intrenchments. After the defeat of the 
Confederate forces at Five Forks, the Cavalry divi- 
sions of Generals Munford and the Lees united, after 
crossing Hatcher's Run, so as to cover the Ford 
Road crossing of that stream. They were joined 
during the night by four brigades of infantry, under 
General R. H. Anderson, sent out by General Lee, by 
routes north of Hatcher's Run, to cover the collec- 
tion of General Pickett's disorganized troops and to 
take up a position at Sutherland Station. They 
were there joined, on the morning of April 2, by the 
remnants of General Pickett's command. 




In view of the fact that, on April 7, General 
Grant, in personal command at Farmville, with at 
least two army corps present and ready to his hand, 
permitted the Second Corps to remain isolated at 
Cumberland Church, north of the Appomattox River, 
when holding at bay the entire remnant of the Army 



69 



of Northern Virginia, General Grant's solicitude for 
General Sheridan's safety at Five Forks certainly ap- 
pears to have been excessive and unnecessary. It 
was manifest from the situation that General Lee 
was imperatively held to a defensive course. With 
the loss of the engagement at Five Forks, and the 
occupation of the White Oak Road by the left of the 
Second Corps, the roads south of the Appomattox 
River ceased to be available, as lines of retreat, for 
more than a small fraction of his army ; but the Dan- 
ville Railroad, and its connections with Lynchburg, 
still remained — provided he could maintain his lines 
until the wagon-roads were passable. There is 
nothing to indicate that, under the circumstances, 
General Lee could have invited inevitable, and irre- 
trievable, disaster in the manner apprehended by 
General Grant. It is difficult to understand how the 
White Oak Road could have been opened as a way 
for retreat except by the defeat of the Union Army. 
That General Sheridan at Five Forks was efficiently 
covered upon his right by the position of the Second 
Corps upon and along the White Oak Road, is clear- 
ly indicated by the fact that, upon General Miles re- 
porting to General Sheridan, that officer immediately 
ordered him to retrace his steps to the position he 
had left. 

But General Sheridan (Vol. 2, pp. 172. 173) 
makes another point prominent and explanatory, 
when referring to General Miles 's movements on 
April 2. He says : — 

The night of the 1st of April, General Humphreys's corps — 
the Second — had extended its left toward the White Oak Road, 
and early next morning, under instructions from General Grant, 
Miles's division of that corps reported to me, and supporting him 
with Ayres's and Crawford's divisions of the Fifth Corps, 1 then 
directed him to advance toward Petersburg and attack the ene- 



70 



my's works at the intersection of the Claiborne and White Oak 
roads. 

Such of the enemy as were still in the works Miles easily 
forced across Hatcher's Run, in the direction of Sutherland's de- 
pot, but the Confederates promptly took up a position north of 
the little stream, and Miles being anxious to attack, I gave him 
leave, but just at this time General Humphreys came up with a re- 
quest to me from General Meade to return Miles. On this request 
1 relinquished command of the division, when, supported by the 
Fifth Corps it could have broken In the enemy's right at a vital 
point; and I have always since regretted that I did so, for the 
message Humphre3's eonveyed was without authority from Gen- 
eral Grant, by whom Miles had been sent to me, but thinking 
good feeling a desideratum just then, and wishing to avoid wran- 
gles, I faced the Fifth Corps about and marched it down to Five 
Forks, and out the Ford Road to the crossing of Hatcher's Run. 
After we had gone, '^General Grant, intending this quarter of the 
held to be under my control, ordered Humphreys with his other 
two divisions to move to the right, in toward Petersburg. This 
left Miles entirely unsupported, and his gallant attack made soon 
after was unsuccessful at first, but about three o'clock in the after- 
noon he carried the point which covered the retreat from Peters- 
burg and Richmond. 

Before the Warren Court of Inquiry ( Record, pp. 
127. 128 ) General Sheridan testifies that on the 
morning of April 2, he advanced with General Miles's 
division supported by the Fifth Corps and drove 
the enemy out of the intrenchments at the forks of 
the Claiborne and White Oak roads ; that he cap- 
tured 800 prisoners at the crossing of Hatcher's 
Run ; that he came back as soon as he found they 
had gone from there ; that he didn't care about them 
any more; that he saw General Humphreys, and 
General Humphreys's command; and states: "I 
told him it was not any use for me to go up there, 
and I went back so as to get to the railroad as quick 
as I could." 

In the official report of Lieutenant-General 
Grant, it is stated that on the morning of April 2, 
"General Sheridan being advised of the condition of 



71 



affairs, returned General ]\liles to his proper com- 
mand." This corroborates the official report of Gen- 
eral Humphreys, which states: "At 9 a. m. I received 
intelligence from General Miles that he was on his re- 
turn, and about two miles from the position he had 
occupied the night before on the White Oak Road." 
This is also sustained by the despatch from General 
Meade to General Sheridan, which that officer ap- 
pears to think he received at the hand of General 
Humphreys although the terms of the despatch do 
not support the supposition. As given in the Appen- 
dix to General Sheridan's report of May 16, 1865, 
that despatch is as follows : — 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac. 

April 2, 1865 — 10 a. m. 
General : The enemy has abandoned his line in front of Hum- 
phreys, and is falling back to his own left, and said to be forming 
a little bey-ond Hatcher's Run. 

Humphreys is coming out on the Boydton plank, and Miles 
on the Claiborne road. General Humphreys has assumed com 
mand of Miles ; the 5th Corps is left to you. General Wright is 
moving down ( south ) the Boydton road, with General Ord cover- 
ing his left. We presume you to be on the Cox and River roads. 
If General Humphreys hears you engaged he will move toward 
you. If you hear him engaged you are requested to move toward 
him. 

Geo. G. Meade. 

Major-General Commanding. 
Major-General Sheridan 

General Miles testified before the Warren Court 
of Inquiry ( Record, p. 646 ) that he reported to Gen- 
eral Sheridan as directed, on the night of April 1, 
and was instructed to be ready early in the morn- 
ing, and that he reported again, about 5 o'clock in 
the morning, and received orders to move back and 
attack the enemy's line where it crossed the White 
Oak Road. He continues ; 

I moved back up this road, and sent word to General Hum- 



72 



phrey's notifying him of my approach and dispositions to attack 
that line at the junction of the road [White Oak and Clai- 
borne Roads] . Just as the enemy abandoned it, I followed them 
over to Sutherland Station, and had a very successful fight with 
them there. 

In his official report of April 21, 1865, General 
Humphreys, after stating the giving way of the ene- 
my's lines in his front at 8.30 a. m., and the return 
of General Miles as above quoted, says : — 

. , . I directed Mott to pursue the enemy by the White 
Oak and Claiborne roads, leading to Sutherland's Station on the 
Southside Railroad, Hays to follow Mott, and Miles to enter 
their works by the White Oak Road and take the Claiborne Road. 
From Miles's position on the White Oak Road he would probably 
lead. I expected by this movement to close in on the rear of that 
portion of the enemy's troops cut off from Petersburg, while 
Sheridan would probabty strike their flank and front. 

Upon t,he arrival of the Major-General commanding the 
Army of the Potomac upon the ground these orders were changed. 
Mott and Hays were ordered to move on the Boydton Plank 
Road toward Petersburg, and connect on the right with Wright's 
corps, (the Sixth), and Miles was instructed to move toward 
Petersburg, by the first right-hand fork road after crossing Hatch- 
er's Run, and connect with the other divisions. 

These orders having' been given, I rode over to Miles's divi- 
sion, which I overtook on the Claiborne Road about a mile be- 
yond Hatcher's Run, meeting also General Sheridan in that vicin- 
ity. Upon hearing from the latter that he had not intended to re- 
turn General Miles' s division to my command, I declined to assume 
further command of it, and left it to carry out General Sheridan's 
instructions, whatever they might be. It had just got in contact 
with the enemy's rear. 

In "The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," Gen- 
eral Humphreys, avoiding even the appearance of re- 
flecting on General Sheridan, say of this : 

Finding that General Miles was satisfied that he could defeat 
the force before him, General Humphreys left him to accomplish it 
and rejoined his two other divisions, . " 

It is evident that General Humphreys first over- 
took General Miles, and afterwards met General 
Sheridan and simply declined to dispute the claim 



73 



made by the latter to continued control of General 

Miles's division. 

The diary of General Fred. T. Locke, Assistant 

Adjutant-General Fifth Army Corps, contains the 

following note for April 2, 1865 : 

Marched at 6 a. m. toward the Claiborne Road. Received 
orders to cross Hatcher's Run to Cox Station. Arrived at South 
Side R. R. at 2 p. m. 

It is about seven miles from the junction of the 
Claiborne and White Oak roads to the South Side 
Railroad at Cox Station, about one mile from the 
same junction to the Claiborne Road crossing of 
Hatcher's Run, and over two miles from that cross- 
ing to Sutherland Station. The report of General 
Charles Griffin, commanding the Fifth Army Corps, 
dated April 29, 1865, says: 

On the morning of April 2d the command moved down the 
White Oak Road some two miles, and massed near the "Dabney 
House," where it remained until about 11 a. m., when it retui'ned 
to the "Five Forks" and moved across Hatcher's Run on the Ford 
Road. 

The Dabney House was a mile west of the junc- 
tion of the White Oak and Claiborne roads. It is 
manifest, therefore, that the Fifth Corps was not 
within immediate supporting distance of General 
Miles's attack upon Sutherland Station, when the 
order to counter-march upon Cox Station was re- 
ceived. On slight reflection, it is also manifest that 
it was impossible to "break in the enemy's right at a 
vital point" by an attack upon the force at bay at 
Sutherland Station, for that force was simply a de- 
tachment, cut off and separated from the right of the 
Confederate lines by a distance of about seven 
miles. 

The writer has willingly corrected an error com- 
mitted by him in a previous publication when, mis- 



74 

led by the conflcting statements of General Badeau's 
work, he defended General Sheridan from the impu- 
tation of having left General Miles unsupported in 
his gallant encounter with the enemy. Otherwise, 
the account as given by General Sheridan has claim- 
ed extended notice only as another illustration of the 
characteristics of his Memoirs, and as bearing upon 
his statement that General Grant ordered General 
Humphreys to be recalled from the pursuit of the ene- 
my in his front, because he intended that quarter of 
the held should be under General Sheridan's control. 
General Badeau, also, makes this last point promi- 
nent in his Military History, but General Grant 
more prudently refrains. It is unnecessary to quote 
further from General Sheridan's words to illustrate 
or emphasize a fact concerning the recognition of 
which he seems to have been needlessly apprehensive. 
General Grant states (Mem. Vol. 2. pp. 454-4-56) 
that, with General Meade, he entered Petersburg on 
the morning of April 3, and that General Meade, in- 
fluenced by an improbable report, wished to cross 
the Appomattox river at that point in pursuit of 
the Confederate army. He says : — 

I knew that Lee -was no fool, as he would have been to have 
put himself and his army between two formidable streams like the 
James and Appomattox rivers, and between two such armies as 

those of the Potomac and the James My reply 

was that we did not want to follow him; we wanted to get 
ahead of him and cut him off, and if he would only stay in the po- 
sition he [ Meade ] believed him to be in at that time, I wanted 
nothing better; that when we got in posession of the Danville 
Railroad, at its crossing- of the Appomattox river, if we still found 
him between the two rivers, all we had to do was to move east- 
ward and close him up. 

Official records show that the evacuation of 
Petersburg by the Confederate army, commenced at 
8 p. m. of April 2, General Longstreet's command 



75 



leading the column on the River Road north of the 
Appomattox River, which they recrossed at Goode's 
Bridge, and reached Amelia Court House some time 
in the afternoon of April 4. General Gordon's com- 
mand was not far from the Court House by night of 
the same date, and General Mahone was at or near 
Goode's Bridge, ten or twelve miles distant. General 
E well's command did not reach the Court House till 
mid-day of April 5, and General Anderson's com- 
mand, which, with General Fitz Lee's cavalry, had 
fallen back by the roads south of the Appomattox 
River, arrived on the morning of that day. 




Recalling now, in connection with the opinion of 
General Grant just quoted, the statement of General 
Sheridan that General Miles, at Sutherland Station, 
"carried the point which covered the retreat from 
Petersburg and Richmond," a glance at any map 
of the environs of Petersburg will indicate that, had 
General Sheridan been with his command upon that 
line of retreat on the morning of April 2, as General 
Meade's despatch of 10 a. m. of that date states it 
was supposed he would be, and had General Humph- 



76 



reys been allowed to continue the pursuit of the ene- 
my retreating before the Second Corps as he pro- 
posed and had commenced to do, there can be no 
doubt but that the whole of the Confederate force at 
Sutherland Station would have been destroyed or 
captured, and the way to the upper crossings of the 
Appomattox River have been left undisputed save 
by possible remnants of General Fitz Lee's cavalry. 
It would seem, therefore, that on the morning of 
April 2, General Grant had at least a very favorable 
chance to confine General Lee between the Appomat- 
tox and James rivers. As it was, with General 
Sheridan controlling that portion of the held, the 
Fifth Corps, by his order, wasted the morning of 
April 2, in a false march eastward from Five 
Forks, and the evening of April 3, found the 
Army of the Shenandoah, and the Fifth Army 
Corps, confronted by the Confederate rear-guard 
at Deep Creek — but little more than twenty 
miles west of Sutherland Station. Then ensued 
movements that space forbids to follow in detail 
here. Suffice it to say, that, — the concentration of 
"the Army of the Shenandoah" with the Army of the 
Potomac, at Jettersville ; — the retarding of the ar- 
rival of the infantry at that point until the after- 
noonfbf April 5, by the erratic movements of General 
Sheridan's cavalry upon the approaches from the 
east; — the fact that at midnight of that date Gen- 
eral Sheridan could give no more definite account of 
the enemy then moving in full force, unretarded and 
unobserved, upon the unguarded bridges at Farm- 
ville, than such as enabled General Grant to "have 
no doubt Lee was moving right then" ; — the sac- 
rifice of General Read and Colonel Washburn, and 
their gallant little command, on the morning of 



77 

'April 6;— the fact that the retreating Confederate 
army was first discovered at 9 a. m. of April 6, by 
the cavalry escort attached to the headquarters oi 
the Second Army Corps; — the disappearance of the 
despatches of the commander of that corps giving 
information of the unequalled achievement of his 
troops in the combat which immediately followed, 
and which made possible General Sheridan's share in 
the victory at Sailor's Creek; — the ignoring of the 
isolated position of the Second Corps when at Cum- 
berland Church on the afternoon of April 7, it held 
at bay north of the Appomattox River all that re- 
mained organized of the Army of Northern Virginia ; 
- the separation of General Grant from General 
Meade, and from direct communication with Gener- 
al Lee, on the early morning of April 9 ; — these, and 
many other details of that movement from Peters- 
burg to Appomattox Court House, admit of but one 
intelligible explanation — that claimed by Generals 
Badeau and Sheridan, and tacitly admitted by Gen- 
eral Grant. 

The Arm}' of the Potomac has never asked to 
share the reputation, or the responsibility, attach- 
ing to the peculiar tactics of that campaign ; but it 
will be an ungrateful country indeed that fails to 
recognize and award that army — tried and true as 
few armies have ever been — the respect and grati- 
tude due to the heroic loyalty and self-forgetfulness 
that nerved its efforts, and in every trial proved it, in 
the words of its noble chief, "regardless of any other 
consideration than the vital one of destroying the 
Army of Northern Virginia." 



THE PERSONAL MEMOIRS AND MILITA- 
RY HISTORY OF U. S. GRANT VERSUS THE 
RECORD OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, 
By Carswell McClellan, Brevet Lieutenant- 
Colonel U. S. Vols. etc. With maps. Crown 8 vo, 
gilt top, $1.75. 

HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY. 
BOSTON AND NEW YORK. 

"A painstaking and seaiching examination of the joints in 
Grant's armor by a soldier who bears no maJice, yet is warmly 
concerned in the good name of other military commanders. Such 
criticism helps to make up the great account." 

—Atlantic Monthly. 



1%^ 



